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1.0 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Part I of this report showed that Lesotho is the most 
structurally dependent of the BLS countries. This 
situation is largely a result of the geo-political 
position of this small state, since it is entirely 
enveloped by South Africa and lias no access to the 
outside world except through South Africa and thus 
lives by the latter1s"grace and favour". Although 
a treaty for British assistance of 1834 confined Basotho* 
to the lands between the Orange and Caledon Rivers 
and beyond the Caledon to a distance of twenty-five 
or thirty miles* territorial wars with Boers in 1866 
resulted in Basotho's serious loss of land when Basotholand 
was proclaimed British Territory in 1868. Today,
Lesotho comprises a tiny 30,000 square kilometres of 
bare rock between the Caledon and Orange Rivers with 
only 13%, highly eroded lowlands classified as suitable 
for cultivation.
The question of loss of land, and the inception of 
the gold mining industry in South Africa in 1886 were 
the root causes of the extreme form of dependency found 
in Lesotho today. The emergence of a wage-earning 
class through the operation of market forces was clearly 
inadequate to meet the needs of the South African mining 
industry. Therefore "extra-economic" methods had to be 
used to re-inforce the process of forced proletarianization 
of the Basotho. Central here was the use of the legislative 
power of the state, particularly the Hut tax which was 
doubled in 1879^. This was followed by the establishment 
of the monopsonistic South African Chamber of Mines 
in 1887 and two labour recruiting agencies which establi- 
shed recruiting monopolies. In other words, on the 
supply side of mine labour were harsh taxes and recruiting 
monopolies to prevent the competitive determination 
of wages. On the demand side was the maximum average 
wage system, a collective agreement of the mining 
companies (through the Chamber of Mines) not to permit 
the average wages to exceed a very low maximum rate, *
together with servile labour laws like the pass laws, 
the Master and Servants Act etc. This conscious effort 
by capitalist mining interests (supported by the South 
African State power) divorced the relationship between 
demand and supply of Basotho labour and established 
a system of institutionalised migrant labour composed 
of a cheap, rightless, and unorganized labour force 
as is typical even today.
1. Lesotho Nationals
2. Lord Hailey, The Republic of South Africa and the 
High Commission Territories, London, OUP, 1963
3 . Spense , J E . L esc t ho: The' Politics o f Dependence, 
London, OUP, 1968
4. Spence , op ci t .
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Soil erosion and its reduction of land available for 
arable farming, the slump in agricultural prices 
caused by the depress inn of 1928-33, as well as 
the accompanying sharp drop in Basotholand1s exports 
from £811,057 in the period 1926-29 to £301,872 
in the period 1930-33, and the high prices of imports 
from abroad caused by South Africa's protectionist 
fiscal policy, forced Basotho men to offer their 
labour to South African mines."This was essential 
if taxes were to be paid,exports to balance imports, 
and a host of new needs to be satisfied. It is 
estimated that 50% of Basotho men were absent in 
this way for the greater part of the year and those 
who worked in the gold mines - 28,653 in 1930,for 
example - earned a total of £495,686'.'5 It has 
always been argued that improvements in agricultural 
productivity were very unlikely so long as a sizeable 
proportion of the menfolk were absent for long 
periods.
Problems of structural dependence began to show 
in the fiscal year 1955/56 with a small deficit 
of R232,000. Grants-in-aid from the British Government 
were first received in 1960/61, being of the order 
of R780,000. By 1965/66, the grant-in-
aid had increased six times to R 4 .7 million.
However, in October 1965, an ODA mission noted j
that "This very large increase in the budget deficit 
financed by the grant-in-aid should have had a $
stimulating effect upon the economy, for it should i 
have led to a considerable increase in the purchasing •* 
power in the hands of the general public. ’It appears, 
however, the effect upon economic growth has been
relatively small............. As a result, instead
of savings being ploughed into urban development
.............. they have been drained to the Republic ‘
of South Africa through the commercial banks, the 
Post Office Savings Bank and the building societies. 
Finally, a great part of the increased incomes
  must have led H-o an increase
in imports, with few secondary effects .which
might otherwise have occurred through m e  development
of local industries"^
When the First Five-Year Development Plan was drawn 
up, the overall objective was to lay foundations 
for economic development and economic independence.
- "For Lesotho, economic .independence and economic 
development arc mutually i nt or - dependent . _
5. Spense, J.E. op cit., p. 19
6. "The Development of the Basutoland Economy,
Report of the Ministry of Overseas Development", 
Economic Survey Mission, October, 1965.
Lesotho is dependent on foreign countries for employment 
and incomes, and even for balancing its budget" .
Indeed at this time, almost half of Lesotho’s labour 
force was at any time employed in South Africa; customs 
revenue formed 53% of local revenue; although heavily 
dependent on foreign aid for development,Lesotho was 
a net exporter of capital through the banking system; 
Lesotho's trade deficit had increased from R3 .1 million 
in 1961 to R20.6 million in 1968, showing that the 
domestic market was strongly oriented towards the imports 
of South African manufactured consumer goods, resulting 
in large balance of payments deficits. These structural 
distortions are still found today. They account for 
the largest portion of resource leakages from this 
tiny poor country to the outside world, especially 
South Africa.
Lesotho’s foreign trade relations and the external 
sector in general are dominated by South Africa. As 
such, most of the discussion, except in a few cases 
related to foreign aid and exports, will largely be 
confined to Lesotho’s relations with South Africa. This, 
however, does not play down the significance of leakages 
suffered by Lesotho to some countries other than South 
Africa.
2.0 THE PRESENT STATE OF DEPENDENCY
Roger Bohning defines dependence as "one-sided and 
assymmetrical control over welfare and resources"®
Using the welfare and resource indices for measuring 
dependence, he found that Lesotho is the most acutely 
dependent of the foreign labour reserves. Although 
his measure is more sociological than economic, what 
is significant is to note that Lesotho's migrant labour 
earnings explain the vast difference between the Gross 
National Income and Gross Domestic Product, and largely 
determine the level of investment, consumption, imports, 
and Government revenue and expenditure. Lesotho formalized 
its integration into the South African Labour market 
in an Agreement signed in 1973.
In 1965/66, 53% of Lesotho's recurrent expenditure 
was covered by grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom.5
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7. Kingdom of Lesotho Lesotho: First Five-year 
Development Plan 1970/71 - 1974/75, CPDO, Dec. 1970.
8. Murray, C. Lesotho , A Country Case Study, Liverpool 
U n i v . 1981.
9. The Development of the Basutoland Economy, Report 
of the Ministry of Overseas Development, Economic 
Survey Mission, Oct. 1965.
- 4 -
However, by 1979/80, customs union revenues had long 
taken the place of UK grants-in-aid, being 84% of 
recurrent revenue and 136% of recurrent expenditure.
The Southern African Customs Union Agreement (SACUA) 
of which Lesotho is a member was formalized in 1910 
and its revision in 1969 introduced a new form of dependence 
which forms the largest single source of leakages from 
the Lesotho economy by turning the latter into a market 
for South African products. This integration of Lesotho 
into the South African economy is re-inforced by the 
Rand Monetary Agreement (RMA) of 1974 which formalized 
the circulation of the South African Rand as the sole 
legal tender currency in Lesotho, South Africa, and 
Swaziland, and makes way for a free transfer of funds 
within the monetary area.
Although both SACUA and the RMA incorporate compensation 
arrangements, what is unique is the inequality of the 
partners involved in this economic integration, and the 
overwhelmingly dominant position of South Africa. This 
encourages streams of resource outflows from Lesotho into 
South Africa which seem to strongly outweigh the compensation 
elements. Because of considerable inconsistencies in 
alternative data sources and therefore a number of 
questions regarding validity, it is not easy to quantify 
the extent of Lesotho's dependence. The problem is 
compounded by the existence of many other forms of 
integration in the fields of power, communications, 
tourism, family ties etc. A further complication comes 
from the fact that the oppressive system of apartheid in 
South Africa has produced streams of refugees who have 
strained the meagre resources in Lesotho. This problem 
is linked to South Africa's policy of distabilizing Lesotho 
which has led to a diversion of vast resources to non­
productive allocations.
Economic distortions caused by this extreme form of 
dependence force the government to rely heavily on 
borrowing from commercial banks and on foreign aid.
In the fiscal year 1981/82, the budget deficit reached 
R67 million or 11.7% of GNP. This chronic deficit 
has stretched the use of foreign resources to include 
the financiang of large elements of public consumption.
The country's propensity to import is also increasing.
10. Annual Statistical Bulletin, Kingdom of Lesotho, 
1981.
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In 1966, imports formed 48% of private consumption and
61% of the GDP. However, in 1979/80, they formed 81%
and 115% respectively. On the other hand, the percentage
of imports covered by exports remained minimal during
this period. Looking at the same problem differently,
in 1966, private consumption formed 122% of GDP, but
in 1979/80, this percentage had risen to 142%. This
is a strong measure of the impact of migrant earnings
on the Lesotho economy, and signifies a unique ratio
of foreign - to domestically - generated income. The
JASPA report estimated that in 1969, 50% of customs
union receipts were generated by migrant earnings.
In 1980/81, when launching the Third Five Year Development 
Plan 1980 - 1985, a five page preamble revealed Lesotho's 
concern over growing dependence. The commodity market, 
the money market and the labour market form a system 
of formal agreements which re-inforce leakages from 
the Lesotho economy in general, and South Africa's capital 
accumulation in particular.
3.0 Commodity Trade-Related Leakages
Figures for 1980 show that 97.4% of Lesotho's imports 
come from the Southern African Customs Union area or 
Common Customs Area (CCA). In addition, 40.6% of Lesotho’s 
exports go to the CCA. When one talks of international 
trade, therefore, in the case of Lesotho, one is practically 
talking of the trade relations that Lesotho has with 
other members of the Southern African Customs Union 
Area (SACUA). This limitation is strengthened by the 
fact that customs revenue (1979/80 figures) forms 84% 
of total revenue and 51% of recurrent expenditure.
Section 3 of PART I of this report made a detailed analysis 
of the customs union arrangements inSouthern Africa.
SACU provides its members with duty - free trade, equal 
customs and excise duty rates, revenue - sharing arrangements 
which, since 1969, are related to the current import 
consumption and production of dutiable goods and have 
a 42% enhancement factor which acts as compensation 
for negative effects on less developed members, up to 
8 years protection of infant industries in less developed 
countries against South African competition, and mutual 
consultation from time to time. In 1965 an ODA Fconcmic 
Survey Mission concluded that "Under the [customs] 
arrangements described, import duty and excise revenue 
cannot be increased in accordance with the fiscal requirements 
of Basutoland, nor can protective duties be imposed 
to foster local Basotho industries. To the extent that 
the Republic has built up South African industries by 
means of tariff protection and import control, consumer 
costs will have teen rciised and Basutoland revenue will 
have been reduced beyond what it would otherwise have 
been although there has been no absolute decrease in 
the yield of the South African tariff, owing to 
the Republics need to increase dutyrates for fiscal
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purposes11. An analysis of the 1969 revision to the 
customs union will indicate if the situation has changed, 
or whether, if there is no change, there is adequate 
compensation lor these adverse el feet s.
3.1 Lesotho's Economic Position in SACUA
In accordance with article 10 of SACUA, Lesotho passed 
laws and regulations1  ^ aimed at implementing the agreement. 
The map of Lesotho below shows that Lesotho exhibits 
the true characteristics of an open economy, marked 
by an innumerable number of border posts, some not even 
manned by customs officials. It has thus not been possible 
to get correct estimates of imports into Lesotho. ihere 
is a clear case of undercoverage at border posts. Lesotho's 
settlements are more concentrated . near the border 
with South Africa, and each of them is independently 
connected with a trading centre in South Africa. Since 
imports of goods and services go directly into the numerator 
of the revenue-sharing formula, under-coverage has a 
net-effect of reducing the amount accruing to Lesotho.
The situation is worsened by the fact that the postal 
system has become a significant agent of purchasing 
South African goods but there is no record of declarations 
by private residents (see Table I). Even if, in terms 
of the Customs and Excise Regulations, 1972, it is a 
crime to fail to declare imported goods and services, 
there is no strict enforcement. The main reason seems 
to be the fact that imports are not directly connected 
with revenue collection. A recent development involves 
the case of unlicenced venders. Many South African 
companies get unlicenced contacts in Lesotho who import 
goods through the post office and sell them sometimes 
up to double their^ South African prices-. . There are no 
statistics for this kind of trade but the losses to 
Lesotho involve under-recording of imports, failure 
to collect licence fees and income tax. Even if SACUA 
offers Lesotho the opportunity to alter domestic 
policies to take advantage of the revenue distribution 
formula, the impact of such policies will always be 
defused by the openness of the economy. For example, 
even if the liquor distribution laws provide for the 
Lesotho Liquor Commission (a parastatal) to be the 
sole importer of liquor into the country, this law has 
not been enforced country-wide in that it is generally 
cheaper to import liquor through neighbouring South 
African towns than to have it distributed from a single 
town in the country.
11. Economic Survey Mission op cit. p. 90.
12. The Customs and Excise Order No. 14 of 1970 and 
the Customs and Excise Regulations, 1972.
( a ;
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TABLE I
DECLARATIONS AT BORDER ROSTS 
OF LESOTHO'S IMPORTS BY RETURNING 
RESIDENTS AT BORDER-POSTS, 1977/78 1 
(ROOO'S)
BORDER PRIVATE TRADERS TOTAL %
Maseru Station 4,463,0 42,666.0 47,129.0 25.3
Ficksburg Bridge 19,888.0 26,477.0 46,365.0 24.9
Maseru Bridge 10,325.0 20,528.0 30,853.0 16.6
Van Rooyen's Gate 5,553.0 10,456.0 16,009.0 8.0
Caledonspoort 1,604.0 7,430.0 9,034.0 4.8
Makhalcng Bridge 2,009.0 5,643.0 7,652.0 4.1
Tele Bridge 2,006.0 4,491.0 6,497.0 5.6
Qacha's Nek 1,875.0 4,149.0 6,024.0 3.2
Maseru Post Office - 3,384.0 3,384.0 1.8
Sani Top 417.0 1,694.0 2,111.0 1.2
Peka 192.0 1,314.0 1,506.0 0.8
Leabua Airport 325.0 278.0 603.0 0.3
Mokhotlong Airport 986.0 53.0 1,039.0 0.6
Ramats'eliso's Gate 238.0 619.0 857.0 0.5
Mononts'a 205.0 139.0 344.0 0.2
Ts'upane's Gate 430.0 83.0 513.0 0.3
Seohapo1s 143.0 77.0 220.0 0.1
Trollips 53.0 142.0 195.0 0.1
Ongeluk's Nek 21.0 133.0 187.0 0.1
Morifi 6.0 54.0 60.0 -
Hanger's Drift (UM) - - - -
Mabine's (UM) 276.0 - 276.0 0.1
Liquor Commission - 5,024.0 5,024.0 2.9
Total 51,015.0 134,839.0 185,854.0 100.0
% 27.4 72.6 100.0
Source: Customs and Excise Dept.
UM - Unmanned. 1. Several border posts did not have records see
Map 1
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Table 2 shows Lesotho’s revenue receipts from 
the common customs pool. With the revision of 
the SACUA in 1069 and the sharp increase in miner’s 
wages in South Airica (and therefore of imports), 
the significance of customs revenue earnings 
was clearely established in the late seventies.
In real terms, however, the earnings have been 
somewhat stagnant since 1979/80. Associated 
with this increase is the distortion in the balance 
of trade. Table 3 shows that Lesotho is suffering 
from a chronic balance of trade deficit which 
has risen from a 1965 figure of R12,835,000 to 
a 1980 figure of R328,168,000. While there is 
no doubt that increases in mine labour earnings 
in South Africa arc responsible for the recent 
sharp increases in imports, part of this increase 
comes from the impact of customs revenue- earnings.' ■
Table 4 shows the growing importance of Government 
as an invester, its share in gross fixed capital 
formation having risen to 73%. However, the 
amount is quite small in absolute terms. Of 
equal importance is government consumption expenditures 
70% of which goes towards salaries and wages.
It is through this item that customs revenue 
earnings leak into imports of South African products.
In any case, other than the support of imports 
through civil servants' earnings, the government 
is itself a very large single net-importer of 
South African goods and services. Associated 
with the balance of trade is the distortion of 
sectoral incomes. As will be shown below, the 
free flow commodity market, and the domination 
of the Lesotho commodity market by South African 
imports have the net-effect of suppressing local 
productive capacity. Table 5 shows the superiority 
of the commercial sector in its share of sectoral 
incomes. This is the sector which services imports 
of South African goods and services. The ready 
availability of the latter as well as their 
superior quality undermine the growth of the 
manufacturing sector in Lesotho.
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TABLE 2
LESOTHO’S CUSTOMS REVENUE 
FROM THE SACU REVENUE POOL
1965 - 1984 (ROOO’S)
FINANCIAL AMOUNT INDEX OF (A+B+C)2
YEAR RECEIVED AMOUNT IN FINAL
(t) (FE »FAs)1 RECEIVED YEAR (t- 2)
1965/66 1 ,399 22 . . .  ■ . 5 ;
1966/67 1 ,566 25 -
1967/68 1,934 31 -
1968/69 1,916 30 -
1969/70 4 ,739 7 5 -
1970/71 6,317 100 -
1971/72 5 ,932 94
1972/73 6,717 106 28,939
r
a
)4
1973/74 14,627 232 41 ,842
1974/75 17,286 274 54,261
1975/76 15,257 241 68-,145
1976/77 14,099 223 86;,033
1977/78 32,841 520 130', 88 .1 s"j
1978/79 56,137 887 180;, 3 79
1979/80 71,493 1132 205,092
1980/81 71,396 1130 251,378
1981/82 70,806 1121 *325,991
1982/83 78,746 1247 7 3 7 7 , 5 3 4
1983/84 109,889 1740 494 , 585 1
Source: Department of Customs.
Notes 1. FE - First Estimate. FAs - Final Adjustments. 
2. CIF.
11
TABLE 3 
LESOTHO: BALANCE OE TRADE
(MOOO)
YEAR IMPORTS EXPORTS BALANCE OF
VISIBLE
TRADE
EXPORTS AS 
% OF IMPOR
1965 17,525 4 ,690 12,835 26. 75
1966 22,917 4 ,387 18,530 19,14
1967 23 ,800 4,168 19.632 17,51
1968 23 ,938 3,380 20,558 14,11
1969 23,907 4 ,069 19,838 17,02
1970 22,876 3,716 19,160 16.24
1971 27,997 2 ,197 25,800 7.84
1972 42,972 6,093 36,879 14.17
1973 64,575 8.770 55,805 13,58
1974 81 ,652 9,809 71,843 12.01
1975 122,817 9,240 - 113,577 7.52
1976 178,757 14,645 - 164,112 8.19
1977 195,670 12,180 183,490 6.22
1978 241,401 30,224 - 211,177 12.52
1979 315,391 37,698 - 277,693 11.95
1980 ''3.6.0.,75 7- 44,554 - 328,168 11.95
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF CUSTOMS & EXCISE
YEAR
1967/68
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1975/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
Source:
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL, FORMATION, GOVT EXPENDITURE £ VALUE - ADDED (RQOO'S) 
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMAT ION! GOVERNMENT
TABLE 4
(ROOO'S) 
TOTAL GOVT
CONSUMPTION VALUE- 
IXPFNDITURF. _ ADDED
C0MPANSAT10N 
OF FMPT.OYEES
PURCHASES OF 
GOODS £ SERVICES
(1) (2) (2); (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) 4)i(3) (5)i (3)
4,371 1 ,680 0.58 6,818 4 ,033 - - 0.59 •
4 ,902 3,275 0.67 6,192 4 ,308 - - 0.70 %
4,912 1,766 0.36 6,137 4 ,405 - - 0.72 .
5 ,145 2,761 0. 54 6,223 4,321 - - 0.70 - •
7 ,148 3 ,826 0.54 8,299 4 ,696 - - 0.57
8,642 3,461 0.40 10,756 4,985 7,322 4,794 0.46 0.68
10 ,696 5,220 0.49 12,077 ; 5,505 9,075 3,818 0.46 0.75
14.486 5,643 0.39 15,787 5,277 9,535 7,386 0.33 0.60
23,490 12,559 0.53 23,126 7,780 15,026 8,781 0.34 0.65
38,215 20,862 0.55 25,551 10,461 18,237 8,495 0.41 0.71
67,960 51 ,462 0.76 30,481 12,163 21 ,068 10,311 0.40 0.69
59,617 43,665 0.73 44 ,369 18,964 31,104 14 ,031 0.43 0.70
Kizilyalli, H. Options for the Lesotho Economy: Perspective Plan Alternatives,
CPDO, Maseru, February 1982.
TABLE 5—**—*■-
SECTORAL INCOMES, GDP AND GNP 
AT CONSTANT (1970/71) PRICES.
YEAR
Manufacturing 
mining and 
energy
(1)
Building & 
construction
(2)
Transport
(3)
Other +/ 
services
(4)
GDP
at,
factor
cost
(5)
GDP 
at 
market 
prices 
(■■> •
GNP
at
market
prices
(7)
Indirect
taxes
. -
(8)
1967/68 2 902 1 885 290 22 231 48 382 50 841
■ " ■ 
62 500 2 459 1
1968/69 2 361 1 909 293 21 985 48 183 50 597 63 000 2 414 !
1969/70 3 195 1 627 284 21 843 47 485 51 359 63 900 3 874
1970/71 2 873 1 440 305 22 273 47 933 52 486 74 800 4 653 |
1971/72 2 654 1 923 419 22 857 43 394 47 555 71 900 4 161
1972/73 3 360 2 301 1 004 24 643 52 130 56 700 84 500 4 570
1973/74 4 923 2 847 1 522 27 250 62 826 71 498 107 400 8 672
1974/75 6 995 3 133 1 860 30 8.11 65 926 75 790 119 300 9 864
1975/76 4 S39 3 068 1 258 30 398 61 468 69 514 134 000 8 046
1976/77 4 729 4 238 1 555 30 768 72 927 81 100 153 300 8 173
1977/78 7 136 8 667 2 207 35 410 85 560 95 426 170 500 12 866
1978/79 11 865 6 895 1 939 35 559 90 315 110 045 182 600 I 19 730 !
+/ Other services include trade, communications, catering; finance, real estate and business services, non-profi 
services, community and personal services.
Source: D. Miljkovic, "National Accounts - Lesotho: 1967 - 1979" Bureau of Statistics, March 1981.
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3.1.1 Problems of the Revenue Sharing Arrangement
The revenue accrual from SACUA is calculated using 
the following formula:
R = 1.42 (AfrB+C) . H
(D+E+F+G)
Where R = the amount of revenue that will accrue
to Lesotho in respect of a given year t.
A = CIF value (including duties paid or
payable) at border of all imports into 
Lesotho in year t.
B = the value of excisable and sales duty goods
produced and consumed in Lesotho in year t.
C = the excise and sales duties paid on goods 
referred to in B in year t.
D = CIF value of merchandise imports into the
SACU area in year t.
E = the customs and sales duties paid on D
above.
F = the value of excisable and sales duty goods
produced and consumed in the SACUA in year t.
G = the excise and sales duties paid on F
above.
H = the common revenue pool of customs, excise
and sales duties collected during year t 
(H = E+G).
Other than problems of double counting and inconsistencies 
relating to rebates and refunds which were discussed 
in detail in PART I of this report, we see that 
since 97.4% of Lesotho's imports come from South
Africa, Lesotho directly assists the industrialization
of South Africa at the expense of its own productive 
capacity. However, undermining the latter means 
a lower B and C which, until now, is almost insigni­
ficant. As long as the system of industrial 
rebates and refunds and the use of tariff and non­
tariff barriers favour the industrialization of 
South Africa at the expense of that of Lesotho, 
as long as Lesotho's consumption patterns are moulded 
by South African standards and thus oriented towards 
the importation of South African consumption goods,
B and C in the compensation formula will always 
remain insignificant.
13. Kizilyalli H. Options for the Lesotho Economy
in  the Year 2,000: Perspective Plan A l t e r n a t i v e s  
CPDO, February, 1982
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This reduction in the enumerator results in a lower 
accrual to Lesotho. It must ho added that since 
the incorporation of the stabilization range in 
the formula to limit the deviations to between
17% and 23% (for BLS as a whole) of the common
revenue pool, the difference between revenue accruals 
and actual payments for Lesotho has always been 
positive.14 This means Lesotho still continues 
to give South Africa an interest-free loan which 
is equivalent to the compounded difference.
3.1.2 The Price-Raising Effects of Tariff and 
Non-Tariff Barriers in SACUA
Many Studies have concluded that the present levels 
of revenue stabilization or compensation in SACUA 
are inadequate because of the price-raising effects 
of tariffs in the CCA.1  ^ Gray and Hoohlo used
a sample of 42 commodities representing 29% of
Lesotho's imports in 1977, and found that Lesotho's 
imports from South Africa carried a total tax burden 
(implicit plus explicit taxes) of 23%. They also 
suggested a mark-up of 20% over South Africa’s 
ex-factory or ex-farm gate prices for transport 
charges and wholesale profit margins.
The difference between world prices and South African 
prices of imports into Lesotho is caused by (i) 
the explicit taxes, and (ii) the effects on South 
African prices of imports quotas, restrictions, 
licensing, of the monopolistic market structure 
of the South African economy.^ and of restrictive 
business practices (these can generally be termed 
the implicit tax burden). The Lesotho Study showed 
that for a limited number of commodities, South 
African ex-factory prices were on average 37.3% 
higher than the comparable world prices1(). '
14. Department of Customs and Excise. 1
15. (i) "Estimate of Duty Content of Botswana’s 
Imports" paper presented to the Study C pup on the Revenue 
- sharing Formula, Pretoria, 6 May 1981.
(ii) Gray, J.G. and Hoohlo, S.G. "The Direct Duty Content of 
Lesotho's Imports and the Protective Price Raising Effect 
of Tar:if Protection by South Africa", Ford Research Proiect 
Nov. 1978. J
16. The Study useo 1977 prices, ihe South African surcharge* was 
ignored and cif prices were obtained by marking up prices 
by 9%. For transport charges (South Africa to Lesotho)
and for other mark-ups, an addition of 20% was made to the 
South African ex-tactory prices to obtain the prices at 
the Lesotho borders.
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The finding of this study is that the total implicit 
tax burden (including explicit taxes and effects 
of other protective measures, restrictions, etc 
on Lesotho's imports amounted to 23.35% or R84.24 million 
in 1980. This is an indication that the present 
compensation level is very inadequate.
A study of Tables- 0 and 7 gives a false picture in that 
it gives an average all duty rate of 13.05% for 
the whole SACU area yet the one for the 1976 imports 
into Lesotho was given as 6.2%.17 This would mean the 
17% stabilized and compensated revenue rate represents 
over-compensation for Lesotho. However, a thorough 
analysis of Table 8 reveals certain hidden elements.
In a study of the price-raising effects of duties 
introduced for the protection of South African 
industries on the input and output of industries 
which produce specific product groups, the South 
African Board of Trade and Industries investigated 
both the nominal and the effective rates of protection. 
Lesotho's imports of raw materials are quite insigni­
ficant, so the area of concern is the rates of 
protection for outputs. The mode of the nominal 
rate of protection for intermediate and final products 
and capital goods ranges between 21.4% and 24.3%.
On the other hand, the mode of the effective rate 
of protection (excluding raw materials) ranges 
between 21.6% and 27.9%. This shows that the 17% *
stabilized and compensated revenue rate does not *
contain any compensation element in it. These 
results show that South Africa's manufacturing
GDP is increased 2 2 % - 2 8 % by protective duties 
which is a good indicator of the polarization of
incomes within the SACUA, and which has to be incor- i>
porated into the compensation formula.
t* r
Since 1924-25 when South Africa embarked on an 
explicit and regorous policy of promoting the develop 
ment of secondary industry behind tariff protection 
and import control, the distribution oi. benefits 
to Lesotho and other small SACUA membei was undermined. 
Industrialization has taken place in Sc th Africa 
and Lesotho has suffered the trade diversion costs.
On the other hand import controls have undermined i
the revenue arrangements of the agreement and the 
shares distributable to BLS by reducing the volume 
of imports into SACUA. The common tariff is simply 
and caielully tailored to meet the protection requirements 
of South African industries although in 1978 it *
generated 4% of the South Airican Government revenue.
17. Gray, J.G. and Hoohlo, S.G. op cit. see Tabic 1
YfiAR
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/75
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
Source: 
1 /
2 /
3/
4/
5/
6/
7/ '
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TABLE 6
Rates of fluty in the SAG' Area 
(percentage)
Tot a 1 Sales Esc i se All All duty R a t e () f
import
duty, 7 ra t o-Ll
duty
(local) rate__
duty 
rateAZ
duty
l /rat e±L
rateafter
compen^
sat ionl_
revenue paid to
BLS after
s tab i 1 i 7.at ionJb_
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
8.50 9.97 31 .93 14.57 20.69 _
7.82 8.32 37.11 13.72 19.48 -
7.80 11.15 56.43 14.81 21.04 -
6.45 11.16 33.45 14 .07 19.98 -
6.20 9.28 31 .80 12.76 18.12 -
5.12 7.32 25.94 9.92 14.08 17.04
5.39 8. 70 28. 50 11.43 16.23 18.11
5 .21 10.71 30.60 12 .98 * 18.44 19.22
9.94 12.72 30.67 16.50 23.42 21 . 71
8.37 10.29 29.94 14.85 21.06 20.53
6.26 19.93 21.96 11.40 16.19 18.09
4.57 18.05 19.47 9.62 13.65 16.857JL
Customs Union Commission, in Kizilyalli, H. op cit.
Total amount of customs, sales and ad valorem customs*! 
(excise) duties and surcharge collected on imports asj 
a percentage of the duty inclusive value of imports into 
the SACU area (i.e. cif. value of imports'plus the 
duties collected on them). I
jj
Amount of sales duties (local) collected as percentage 
of the duty-inclusive value of the (sales); dutiable goods.
Amount of excise duties collected as a percentage of 
the duty-inclusive value of the excisable goods.
Total pool revenue as a percentage of .the denominator 
of the revenue-sharing formula (11/(D + iJ-F + G)) .
Column (4) multiplied by the compensation factor, 1.42.
I
Stabilized rate applied from 1974/75 on, when the sta­
bilization factor was introduced.
in lieu of this rate the lower limit of the stabilization 
rate, i.e. 17.0% would apply in the calculation of 
revenue shares of BLS countries, by section 5 (a)
(iv) of the amended Article (14) of t h e A g r e e m e nt .
TABLE 7
ESTIMATES OF DIRECT DUTY CONTENT OF IMPORTS TO 
LESOTHO - 1976
]
I tem
mports
976
O r i g i n Duty Liability Direct Duty Content Total Duty 
Content
Content
1976
| Duty a s % 
of C.I.F.
RSA Other CUS. 1-S EXC. CUS. 1-S EXC.
Live A n i m a l s  
Foodstuffs 
Beverages 8c 
Tobacco
2,427
35,301
7 ,863
2,427
34,301
7,500
1,215
363 42.9% 4.8% 36.8% 155.9 17.5 2 , 760 1 2,916.0 37.1%
Crude Materi­
al s
Mineral Fuels 
8c Lubricants 
Animal and 
Vegetable 
Oils
1 ,295 
11,742
1 ,561
1 ,243 
8,881
1 ,459
52
2,862
102
1.3% 
43 . 7%
9.2%
1.3%
0.2%
7.6%
39.1%
0.7
1,249.3
9.4
0.7
6.5
7.8
3,476.1
0.7
4,725.4
9.4
40.2%
0.6%
Chen ical 
Elements & 
Compounds 
Manufactured 
Goods Classi­
fied by Mate­
rial
9,525 
41 ,809
7 ,172 
34 , 568
2,353
7,239
7.6%
11.1%
7.9 % 
7.0%
2.2% 179.4
804.6
185.8
508.6
160.2 339.6
|
804.8
3.6%
2.2%
M a c Line r y 8l 
Transport 
H q ni pmcnt 
Mi see 1laneous 
Manufactured 
A r 1 1 c 1 o s
22 , 730 
45,140
14,083 
39 ,349
8,647
5,791
6.3%
13.3%
4 . 28c 
6.3%
7.2%
2.9%
541 .1 
768.3
359. 7 
362.4
1 ,014.4 
77.3
1,555.5
845.6
6.8%
1.9%
TABLE 8
RATES OF PROTECTION IN CCA
gaw intermediate Final Capital
Materials Products Products goods
other than 
cap i ta I 
goods
(1) NOMINAL RATES OF PROTECT ION(%)
Nominal
Duties on
OUTPUT
Average
Median
Mode
14.9
15.0
11. 1
18.3 
18.8
21.4
23.5
2 2 . 6  
24.3
18.7
18.8
22.5
Nominal 
Duties on 
INPUTS 
Average 
Med ian 
Mode
14.9
15.0
11.1
14.9
15.0
11.1
18.3 
18.8
21.4
18.3 
18.8
21.4
(2) EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION(%)
Med ian 
Mode
13.6
10 . 1
20.2
27.9
24.3
25.1
17.1
21.6
Notes: (1) Throughout, the calculations are based on
customs duties which exceed 7.5% ad valorem
(2) The duties on inputs for intermediate pro­
ducts were assumed to be equal to those on 
the outputs of raw materials; the duties 
on inputs for final products were assumed 
to be equal to those on outputs of interme­
diate products.
Source: Customs Union Commission in Kizilyalli, H. op cit
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The distribution of the welfare benefits and costs of a tarif 
in SACUA depends on the location of import-substituting protectee 
industries, the location of consumers of their products, and 
the distribution of revenues and expenditures accruing rom ic 
tariff effect. The benefits have almost entirely acrucd to South 
Africa Lesotho has been affected by the consumption effect 
of the tariff through higher prices paid for imports and protected 
goods produced in South Africa. This is the case with all protective 
instruments used by South Africa ic for all import control measures, 
quotas, voluntary export restrictions, and non-tariff barriers 
to trade. While revenues generated by the impact of the tariff 
on imports from outside the CCA are redistributed to member countries 
from the common pool, there is no revenue flow from the price- 
raising effect of South African produced protected goods, and 
this should be treated as a real cost to the Lesotho economy.
On the other hand, it was estimated that in 1976, the trade 
creation effects of SACU brought South Africa some benefits to 
the order of R66.1 million yet the Lesotho figure was a mere 
R1.5 million.^
3.1.3 Additional Losses Through SACUA: Transportation
Article 16 of SACUA reads " A contracting party shall afford freedom 
of transit without discrimination to goods consigned to and 
from the areas of the other contracting parties" except in the 
case of prohibited imports. This article is very significant 
for a landlocked country like Lesotho which has no link with 
the external world. Since Lesotho has a limited local market, 
it means it depends heavily on transportation facilities, both 
for inputs as well as output. Lesotho depends very heavily 
on transport links with South Africa and long-distance transport 
for many products inside South .Africa is virtually monopolised 
by the South African Railways (SAR) and permission to use alterna­
tive modes of transport is often refused on grounds that the 
South African Railways has to be protected. Moreover, the tariff 
structure of the SAR favours foodstuffs and raw materials over 
manufactured consumer goods. The former are only important for 
large industries and markets located in South Africa.
Restrictions on transportation and their associated high transport 
costs make Lesotho unattractive for certain industries, especially 
footloose industries. These find it difficult to compete with 
South African industries as a result of high transportation costs 
for their inputs and products. The tariff rates arc not only 
high, but the rate of losses is also very discouraging. As such, 
it has proved very difficult to attract assembly industries to 
take advantage of low labour costs. High transport costs also 
lower the returns on Lesotho's exports and increase the import 
bjll. The tinnspoit laritfs provide an important source of revenue 
to oouth Africa without a single element of compensation to Lesotho.
18. Gray and Hoohlo, op cit.
- 21 -
3.1.4 A/lditional Losses Through SACUA: The Quest ion_of_
Tnd us t r i a l  Fro t o d  i on
There is wide scope for selective import substitution in 
Lesotho in view of the fact that the country imports 
almost all its consumer requirements and capital inputs 
mainly from South Africa. Article 6 of SACUA specifies 
that the smaller members of SACUA may levy additional 
duties on imports from other SACUA members to enable 
its new industries to be sufficiently competitive 
for a period not exceeding eight years. An evaluation 
of the sources of spare parts, raw materials, energy 
and expertise, likely implications for transport oi 
manufactures through South Africa or in conveyances 
controlled by South Africa (ie cargo planes and ships, 
railway rolling stock, road conveyors etc) and possible 
new vulnerabilities- to South African policy changes 
in SACU have constrained lesotho in taking advantage 
of this close.
There is no scope in SACU for Lesotho to develop an 
independent commercial policy. Indeed when describing 
this situation, Percy Selwyn says "Small poor countries 
usually cannot afford highly protective tariff structures, 
and may indeed have few industries to protect, import 
duties are more likely to be mainly for revenue 
p u r p o s e s . "19 Any protection is likely to lead to 
changes in the South African tariff shcedules and 
increased transport tariffs for inputs. South Africaj 
has even used non-tariff barriers to prevent 
other members from benefitting fully from SACU. In \
1971, South Africa prevented Honda from setting up
a motor assembly plant in Lesotho, and sevexal sources1 
report disappearances of imports for Lesotho required 
for manufacturing which go beyond the occassional 
humar error and reflect a conscious pattern' of !}
disruption. 20 >
I ' •
Lesotho has thus no option (within SACU) and has resortod 
to a system of industrial incentives. The Pioneer 
Industries Encouragement Act, 1969 provides tax incentives 
for certain manufacturers, hotel and c*>ino keepers, 
and building companies that are being established 
or want to expand their operations in Lesotho. The 
caption from one of the para-statals goes:
19. Selwyn, P. "Industrial Development in Peripheral- 
Small Countries in Selwyn, P. (ed) Development
Policy in Small Countries Univ. of Sussex , T O T  5 .
20. Knotts, .A . 'An Assessment of the Membership
ol of Botswana Lesotho, and Swaziland in the SACU",
Washington DC April 1978.
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Tab 1e 9
COMPARATIVE TAX INCENTIVES IN BLS COUNTRIES
TYPE BOTSWANA LESOTHO SWAZILAND
Tax Holiday On application 6 Yrs None
Investment Allowanes
(i) Machinery 25% 45% 30%
(ii) Industrial Buildings 15% 25% 30%
Initial Allowances:
(i) Machinery None 100% 20%
(ii) Industrial Buildings None 50% 10%
Depreciation Allowances
10-1S%3(i) Machinery Any Rate Covered
above
(ii) Industrial Buildings 10% (straight line) ! 1 4% (str.lin
(iii) Hotels 10% (straight line) 1 1 10% for 5yrs 
5% for lOyrs
Employee Housing Allowance R1000 per house 25% Inv. 
Allowance *
10-20% p.a.
Employee Training Allow. 125% of cost 210% of cost 200% of cost
Company Tax Rate^ 30% 37.5% 37.5%
Losses Carry Forward 5 years Indefinite Indefinite
Citizen Wage Allowance None 110% None
Additional Consessions Available on Available Available on
Application on Application Application
Source: Matsebula, M.S. "Tax Incentives in Swaziland. Some Efficiency
Considerations" in the Journal of Southern African Affairs 
Vol. 2 No. 4, P. 7.  —
Notes:
1. Includes Hotel buildings
2. Remainder claimable over 20 years on a straight - line basis
3. Diminishing Balance
4. Remainder claimable over 4 years.
5. 20% or cost written oil in first year (but not exceeding M100)
10% in subsequent 8 years  (but not exceeding M500)
6. This is 43% in South Afr i ca .
"We know that negotiations with 'lcY°*0|)Ulg/'0" Q Q g S 
normally go as smoothly as a car w i t h  square w cels.
We are in competition with thcsi. areas o  ^ ,,21
investment. That is why we in Lesotho arc clillcrent.
The 1969 Act in Lesotho was followed by the Botswana Incomt
Tax of 1975 and the Swaziland Income Tax (Consolidated)
Act of 1975. Assuming that the aim of industrial 
incentives is to induce foreign investment at minimum 
revenues foregone, this heavy competition and the 
competition with South Africa for industrial location 
imply that the amount of revenue foregone is higher 
than the minimum essential to induce the establishment 
or expansion of foreign owncd/financed operations.
Table 9 shows that Lesotho offers the most generous 
incentices among BLS countries. It has however 
been shown that there are many far more important 
considerations in industrial location in SACUA 
than tax incentives.
The amount of financial leakages through highly 
generous tax incentives can only be appreciated 
if one considers the fact that the Lesotho Government, 
through the Lesotho National Development Corporation 
(LNDC), handles company registrations, licence 
applications, feasibility studies, equity and /or 
loan participation, supplies industrial estates 
(if requred), undertakes several trade/marketing 
promotion missions abroad, and provides certain 
services at subsidized rates, eg manpower training.
All these subsidies together with incentives which 
are over and above that minimum which is necessary 
to induce foreign companies should be treated as 
financial leakages. It is difficult to assess 
their magnitude, but since LNDC has led to the 
birth of 50 subsidiaries in 15 years, this revenue 
loss is quite significant.
3.2 Marketing Arrangements within SACUA
The marketing of agricultural produce in Lesotho 
is closely integrated with the South African market..
Until mid - 70’s, marketing was conducted entirely 
by traders who were connected to South African 
marketing boards. The latter regulated the marketing 
of produce, operated floor price schemes and sometimes 
introduced subsidies which were extended to Lesotho.
21. LNDC "The Longest. Tax Holiday" Maseru (undated 
brochure) .
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Local prices in Lesotho thus closely followed those 
in South Africa. However, the situation was different 
for those places in remote areas. hecause of 
of information and good transport systems, selling
prices were much higher further inland, and those 
for agricultural products, were very low.
In an attempt to rationalize the market ing of agricul­
tural products, the Government passes the Agricultural 
Marketing Act in 1967, and this empowers the Minister 
of Agriculture to set up floor prices. Agrarian 
produce prices are thus gazetted at the end of 
each harvest season, and they arc still heavily 
determined by South African prices. It should 
be noted that South African farmers enjoy substantial 
subsidy schemes and thus produce at lower cost 
than Lesotho farmers. On the other hand, the Price 
Control Act, 1979 empowers the Minister of Commerce 
and Industry to control the prices of manufactured 
goods in Lesotho but there is no evidence that, 
this power has ever been utilized. We have already 
seen that under SACU, manufactured goods of South 
Africanorigin carry a high price-raising effect 
caused by many protective practices. Monopolistic, 
traders in the Lesotho inland are thus free to 
charge anything, yet the farmers have their prices 
gazetted. Unlike the South African counterpart 
who is subsidized heavily, the Lesotho farmer sufferls 
from a clear case of transfer of resources through  ^
the remote trader to South African industry.
I
Lack of local productive capacity, as wel*l as lack 
of information on South African prices opens a 
lot of room for speculation in the marketing of 
imports from South Africa. This is worsened by the.; 
fact that these imports are dominated by items fi
of necessity with their inelastic demand 'characteristic.
Besides, it is very difficult to envolve a sound 
price policy for items which are not locally produced 
as there are no records of inputs usl>d. It is 
clear therefore that the SACU market structure 
favours the marketing of South Afric */i products 
at highly monopolistic prices, a transfer element 
to South African traders and industries. /
Lack of productive capacity means that Lesotho's I
exports aie largely dominated by raw materials, 
particularly wool, and mohair, and grains. These 
items, purchased at low prices, contribute to the 
South African transport revenue and taxes, and 
create imployment during the processing stages 
before they come back to Lesotho as high-priced 
imports. Lor 19/9/jsO, 4 } ‘I of Lesotho's exports 
were destined to South Africa, a value of R18.4 million.
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3.3 Othcr Problems with SACU
oArIT hoc intensified Lesotho's dependence on customs 
u n i o n  revenues, Since 1 9 6 9 ,  customs union revenues 
have ranged between 43.9% and 84% of government 
recurrent revenues. Since these revenues arc budgeted 
against recurrent expenditures and the latter is 
dominated by the "Compensation of employees item,
(see Table4 ), the drain of resources from Lesotho 
through the continued operation of loopholes in 
the existing revenue - sharing formula is self- 
reinforcing, a trend which will be very difficult 
to reverse.
In SACU, tariff, excise, and sales duty rates are 
set by South Africa (articles IV and VIII provide 
for the South African tariff, excise and sales 
duty rates to prevail throughout the CCA), and 
rebates, refunds and drawbacks applied in Lesotho 
(and other smaller members) are those applicable 
in South Africa. The net effect is that Lesotho 
has no control over rates of indirect taxation.
The geographical position of the country and the 
free flow of products provided by article2 inhibit 
action with regard to increased indirect taxation 
even where this is possible under SACU. The main 
population centres lie quite close to the frontiers, 
so it is always possible for increases in tax to 
be frustrated in effectiveness as a result of movements 
of goods across borders. On the other hand, since 
62.6% of total consumption and capital formation 
is covered by imports, the implicit cost structure 
due to SACU taxes and South .African protective 
practices leave little scope for the imposition 
of additional indirect taxes. This problem has 
been execerbated by the instability of the revenue 
yield from customs which has ranged from as low
as 9.2% to as high as 2 6 .3%.^2 The flow of revenue
itself is threatened by the fluid political climate 
in Southern Africa. The formula itself, as has been
discussed in detail in Section 4 of PART I, has
several omissions and elements which undermine 
accruals to Lesotho.
The loss of fiscal discretion has another implication 
for industrialization in Lesotho. Inspite of the 
fact that the GNP in 1979/80 was 591% more than 
that in 1970/71, the responsiveness of the manufactu- 
ring sector has only changed very little from a
Lesotho's International Economic 
Relations - Iowards Integration -or Disengagement 
in Soulhon Airica? Ford Research Project, August, 
1979.
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1972/73 share of GDP of 4 . 72% to that of 1979/80 
of 4 74?> The expanding local market demand is 
thusmatched by increased importation of South 
African manufactured goods. By undermining local 
productive capacity, therefore, SACU reinforces 
the polarization of development by encouraging 
the outflow of resources from Lesotho to support 
South African industrialization.
Article 20 of SACU provides for consultations amongst 
members through the Customs Union Commission.
However, at the October, 1982 annual meeting of 
the Commission, South Africa refused to endorse 
a revised revenue-sharing formula which had been 
drawn up after 18 months of investigation by an 
all-party study group.23 If endorsed, BLS would 
increase their revenue shares by 10%. The main 
elements of negotiation were a higher rate of stabili 
sation factor in duty payments (19% to 25%) and 
the elimination of a two-year lag in the receipt 
of full payments.24 This would have meant a total 
lump sum payment of R200 million to BLS. After 
his "Confederation" summit with South African 
homeland states on 11th November, the South African 
Prime Minister declared:
"We see the Customs Union not in isolation as a 
revenue-sharing arrangement, but as part of a compre­
hensive regional development strategy"23
I
It is obvious from this statement that instead 
of signing the revised formula, South Africa wants 
to use the Customs Union as a political lever, 
specifically to pull BLS into the orbit of the 
constellation of States that will include the South )• 
African homelands and be politically and economically 
dominated by South Africa.
3.4 Other Aspects of Trade
An examination of Lesotho's exports ‘eveals that 
54.6% of their value in 1981 was mad'- up of diamonds 
and 98.8% of these are destined for the EEC. The i 
sorting and valuation of diamonds as well as selling 
at the Central Selling Organization in London were < 
the responsibility of De Beers, a subsidiary of 
the Anglo-American Corporation, until the mine closed 
down in 1982.
23« African Business, January 1983
24. Ihe Stabilisation formula and the difference between 
revenue accruals and actual payments were discussed 
K  and 6.0 of PART 1 of this report.
*  Bail y_A a 1 _I 2th November 1982.
I esothe other than acquiring some shares, hud little 
control ov, r the opera, ion-.. oC th is m., I L i nnt i -ma) 
corporation which is l a  sc! in South A. in.. 
uucaucc of various stn.pss oC pro-xsi.oi! ..uUi<lo 
Lesotho, and because 01 coin.n 1 ts ion lug and suhcommissJoiung 
the proceeds accruing to Lesotuo as well as the 
multiplier from the export earnings as a whole 
remained small. In aduition, because oI ui do L J u c L u a 
t ions in the diamond market, thi.s single item is 
responsible for the i n s t ub i 1 i t > and unreliability 
of tne export sector.
The remaining 1.2% of diamond exports is sold to 
South Africa. This percentage is handled by several 
licenced private leaders. It is through this cnannel 
that a lot of diamonds are smuggled into South 
Africa. Official sources think that several millions 
of Rand worth of diamonds are involved. This is 
worsened by the nature of deposits which encourage 
sna11-scale diggings by a multitude of private 
concerns net easily supervised. Snuggling is also 
rife in agricultural marketing. Since 1981, no 
trader is allowed to purchase agricultural produce 
except Co-op '^esotho, a national marketing company.
fa avoid lower prices paid by this company (in 
order to incorporate transport costs, handling 
and storage and a mark-up), farmers are known to 
smuggle their autout across the border to take •
advantage of higher prices paid by dealers in South 4 
Af r ica. ~ . * %
A growing development in recent years involves 
massive smuggling of cars and high-value commodities 
.stolen from South Africa into Lesotho, by South ;i
Africans. These are not declared c.t the borders 
and in several cases which are discovered, they 
are impounded by police who wait for South Utienn 
claims.-'’ The loss to Lesotho here Lnvol.'es reduced 
Customs revenue earnings, financial 'osse, by I.esotl 
residents, and administrative costs.
finally, some foreign aid inflows cai'y donor conditions 
which tie procurement to the donor or * donor - do:;- i nat c i 
countr) even at prices which are far above world i 
p i i c c* s . losuUio s S e c o n d - an d 1 h 1 r d - F i v e - Ye a r bevel q p - 
ment PI ans ate dominated by large projects requiring 
a lot. of construction and engineering equipment.
26. Lesotho Weekly, 9th July, 1982.
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This condition, other than raising the level of 
the external debt for less value (in real terms) 
implies perpertual reliance on high-cost garts 
during the maintenance life of a project.
Besides, because of undersupply in Lesotho for 
manv project inputs, whatever comes in the form 
of foreign aid leaks into South Africa through 
trade diversion. lr) several cases where donors approve 
waiver applications to .enable Lesotho to buy from 
lower cost sources, transport costs and costs resulting 
from delays in deliveries compel the latter to 
buy from South Africa. It is estimated that more 
than 95% of construction materials in Lesotho are 
imported from South Africa with an inflation iate 
of 23%.28 In addition, most of the back-up services 
for major projects are supported by South African 
economic infrastructure eg. transport, fuel, electricity, 
as well as parts. In this way, foreign resources 
should be seen to be having a large element of 
direct support for South African industries.
3.5 The Migrant Labour Market
It is not conventional to treat labour as a traded 
commodity, but from the point of view of migrant 
labour's contribution to Lesotho's foreign earnings, 
one should reserve moral judgement. In the 1976 
population census, 12.5% of the population was 
classified absent, and of those absent, 88% or 
134,450 were classified as economically active 
people working in South Africa. Of these 89.7% 
were males. Table 10 shows and sectoral classfica- 
tion of those who were 10 years and over (age)by 
place of work. It can be seen that 41.4% of all 
the economically active men or 66.3% of all the 
males employed for wages were employed in South 
Africa. The volume of wage employment in Lesotho 
is still very small. In 1980, it accounted for 
6.4% (^§,3 2 8 people) of the total available labour 
force. Migration to South Africa is therefore 
the only alternative for a majority of Lesotho's 
economically active population, particularly males.
The capitalist creation of a labour reserve in 
Lesotho as well as some of the institutional factors 
that cement the integration of the Lesotho labour 
market into the South African one and make Lesotho 
a typical labour exporting economy have been discussed 
in sections 1 to 3.
27. It was decided not to cite examples in this 
case as many projects are either in the pipe-line 
or second phases.
28 Ministry of hoiks, Quantity Survey Section.
29. Appiah, k. 0.A . "A Report on a Survev of Employ 
ment and Manpower in the Private and Parastatal 
Sectors in Lesotho in 1980, NMDS, October 1981.
TABLE 10
LESOTHO PERSONS 10 YEARS AND OVER EMPLOYED FOR 
WAGES BY INDUSTRY AND PLACE OF WORK, 1076.
INDUSTRY LESOTH
MALES
0
FEMALES
PLACE OF 
L~S0UTFrAF] 
MALES
EMPLOYMENT
tica;
FEMALES
p -  - —  ■ - -]
i
TOTAL 
1 MALES ! FEMALES 
1
Agric. Hunting, Foerstry 
Mining &. Quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, Gas &. Water 
Construction 
Commerce
Transport &. Communication
F i nanc e
Social Services 
Other
2,713 
24,550 
1,852' 
401 
6,072 
2 ,047 
2 ,428 
130 
18,702 
1 , 581
770
703 
1,331 
156 
376 
2 ,602 
86 
50
12 ,987 
1,037
458 
101,835 
2,758 
260 
3,436 
549 
1,681 
58 
3,170 
4 , 755
137 
1 ,401 
583
2
62
493
18
2
7,505 
1 ,993
3,171 
126,385 
4 ,610 
661 
9,508 
2,596 
4,109 
188 
21,872 
6,336
i|
907 
2,104 
1,914 
138 
438 
3,095 
! 104 
52
20,492
3,030
TOTAL (i) 60,476 20078 118,960 12,196 179,436 32,274
PERCENTAGE (ii) 33,7% 62.2% 66.3% 37.8% 100.0% 100.0%
ECON. ACTIVE POP'N ( i i i)1 166,465 122,967 120586 13,864 287,051 136,831 |
(i) as % of the Total in 
(iii) 21.1% 14.7% 41.4% 8.9% 62.5%
I
23.6%
Source Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1979.
N o t e
1. The Economically Active population includes those less than 10 years old.
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It is important to emphasize here that the Lewisian 
mode Is are totally inapplicable in
African Labour market threw overboard all the market 
forces. The gap between supply and demand is closed 
by the application of extra-economic institutional 
forces which in general imply heavy costs on the 
economy of Lesotho.
It has already been said that about 50% of Lesotho s 
imports are financed from migrant earning^. An analysis 
of the contribution of the latter on the Lesotho 
economy is therefore nccessaiy. Section 1.0 above 
attempted to show how the monopsonistic Chamber of 
Mines of South Africa manages to pay subsistence 
wages and still gets an assured supply of labour.
This practice itself, as will be shown below, undermines 
what is due to Lesotho migrants, and largely determines 
what is finally destined for Lesotho.
The two most important items of migrant ecirnings 
are deferred payments and remittances. Those 
which . resulted from.Basotho employed in the 
mines of South Africa use from 1970 to 1979 are shown 
on Table 11. First of all, these two items are strongly 
determined by the wages paid to the migrants. Since 
Lesotho's migrant mine labourers are predominantly 
black,they earn the.lowest tier of wages, averaging 
R140.0 per month in 1979^0. The average for white 
miners was R889.0 per month. The amount which can 
go to Lesotho, therefore, in the way of deferred 
payments and remittances is limited. The question 
of numbers is also important. It can be seen that 
since, 1976, the numbers of miners recruited began 
to fall as the South African government began to 
mobilize black labour within South Africa itself.31 
Even if the relative share of Lesotho in the mine 
labour market initially increased by 2.5 percentage 
points up to 1978, the impact of reduced recruitment 
began to show in 1979 with a fall in the average 
number employed. On the other hand, the absolute 
level or deferred payments and remitancos increased 
because of wage increase which were aimed at attracting 
South African blacks to the mines.
30. "Manpower 2000: Report of the National Manpower
Commission , Department of Manpower Utilization,
South Africa, 1979.
31. See Table 7 in PART I.
TABLE 11
EARNINGS AND EXPENDITURES OF LESOTHO MINE LABOUR MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA,
1970 - 1979
AVERAGE AVERAGE TOTAL RESIDUAL
NUMBER NUMBER WAGE IN EARNINGS DERERRED REMITTANCE OTHER PURCHASING
YEAR RECRUITED EMPLOYED MINING1 IN MINING2 PAYMENTS3 PAYMENTS4 REMITTANCES POWER 5
(1) (2)
97,185
(3) (4) (5)=(3)x(4) (6) (7) (8) (9) = (5) - [ (6) + (8) ]
1970 87,384 18 18,875 2,576 2,062 4,907 9,530
1971 88,012 91 ,080 19 20,766 2,690 2,018 5,399 10,659
1972 101,515 98,822 22* 26,089 3,425 2 ,393 6 , 783 13,488
1973 110,978 110,477 29 38,446 4 ,679 3,963 9,996 19,808
1974 104 ,374 106,251 45 57,365 7,327 5,136 14,915 29,987
1975 134 ,261 112 ,507 74 99,906 12 ,836 7 ,160 25,9/6 53,934
1976 160,516 121,062 88 127,841 17,822 8,240 33,239 68,540
1977 143 , 204 128,941 100 154,729 16,648 10,956 40,230 86,895
1978 115 ,044 124,491 118 176,279 20,343 12,925 45,833 97,178
1979 92 ,823 124,393 140 208,980 22 ,696 15 ,441 54,335 116,538
Souree: Department of Labour, Mine labour Organization Annual Reports, The Financial Mail.
Notes
1. Rand per month.
2. Rmillion
3. Thousand Rand
4. These have been derived through the application of the Work of A.C.A. Van der Wiel 
and the JASPA team (see p. 16 of PART I). The assumption here is that the two items 
involved, cash and goods taken home in hand,have always claimed a fixed share of mi­
grants earnings. This is a crude estimate becau.se it does not take into account ad­
justments resulting from the implementation of the Deferred Payments Act , changes 
in transport costs etc.
5. This item refers to migrants purchases of goods and services which are never transfered 
to Lesotho. It however excludes expenditures - in - kind which are financed from.earnings -
in - kind and were valued at R200.00 per migrant in 1977/78.
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3.5,1 The Disposal of M  i g r ajU^LajKj^t _harn jjig s ^
A fraction of Migrant earnings is deferred until the end 
of the contract period. The balance is either remitted 
to the migrant’s family or spent on goods and services 
in South Africa. It can be seen that more than 50% 
of migrant earnings are "wasted le they are spent 
on goods and services which have absolutely no impact 
on the Lesotho economy as they are not taken acioss 
borders. It is concern over this portion of migrant 
earnings which made Lesotho pass the deferred 1 ay 
Act of 1974 which was replaced by the Deferred Pay 
Act of 1979. According to this Act 60% of a migrant’s 
earnings should be deducted by the employer and paid 
into the Deferred Pay Fund which is managed by the 
Lesotho Bank in Lesotho. An examination of column 
(6) of Table 11 shows that deferred payments formed 
a mere 10.9% of total earnings in 1969. This is 
because of the following loopholes:
(i) If an employee’s desired level of remittances 
is in excess of 20% of his earnings, he is free to 
request that the excess be set off against 60%.
(ii) An employee can make a written request 
to spend part of his remittances in the case of emergency
(iii) Some emploees have "No objection permits" 
which exempt them from the 60% requirement. Similarly, 
even if migrants’ passports are renewed every four 
years, an average contract is 6 months. After" the 
first "tour," a migrant can renew his contract without 
coming back to Lesotho. The 60% requirement is not 
applicable to subsequent renewals in South Africa.
The Act is therefore limited to those cases which 
have been attested in Lesotho.
(iv) Many migrants do not go through the attestation 
process as they have private contracts.
It can be seen therefore that by underpaying Basotho 
migrant workers, and by encouraging expenditure in 
South Africa, migrant labour promotes an accrual 
of vast sums of money to South Africa. In 1979, 
in the mining industry alone, it is estimated that 
R116.5 million was spent in South Africa on goods 
and services which were not imported into Lesotho.
Mine wages are unilaterally fixed by the South African 
Chamber ol Mines. li we assume that mine wages are 
allowed to be as competitive as those in manufacturing^,
nieUn? ' V'° iotal underpayment of Basothomigrant labour amounted c.o K71.6 million or 54% of 
actual total earnings (see Table 12).
32. In South Africa black labour is g e n e r a l l y  not
lav-snH ^ c  Pass1] ^  ^  C?ntrolied by institutional 
tivcness? 1 lmir the degree of competi-
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TABLE 12
COMPARISON OF TOTAL EARNINGS OF BASOIMO WORKERS 
IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING INDUSTRIES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA (ROOO'S, 1970-79)
AVERAGE AVERAGE TOTAL ACTUALTOTAL
-
YEAR EARNINGS 
IN MANUF.1
NUMBER
EMPLOYED
EARNINGS
(ROOO'S)
EARNINGS 
IN MINING
RESIDUAL
EARNINGS
1970 52 87,384 54,528 18,875 35 ,653
1971 57 91,080 62,304 20,766 41 ,538
1972 62 98,822 73,524 26,089 47,435
1973 71 110,477 94,126 38,446 55,680
1974 88 .106,231 112,180 57,365 54 ,815
1975 106 112,507 143,108 99,906 43,202
1°76 125 121,062 181,593 127,841 53,752
1977 141 128,941 218,168 154,729 63,439
1978 161 124,491 240,517 176,279 64,238
1979 188 124,393 280,631 208,980 71 ,651
Source: Department of Labour and Mine Labour Organization
Annual Reports.
i
NOTE. 1 Rand per month.
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Year
WORKING PROFITS IN GOLD MINING 
BY LESOTHO MIGRANTS_(RniilL1-OIL^
Average Profit per
Number Black
Employed Employee (Rand
TABLE 13
CONTRIBUTED
1971-3978)
Total Profit 
Contr ibuted 
by Lesotho^
1971 91 ,080 929.15 84.6
1972 98,822 1484 . 54 146.7
1973 110,477 2645.08 292.2
1974 106,231 4556.63 484 .1
1975 112,507 3996.82 446.7
1976 121 ,062 2667 .36 322.9
1977 128,941 3671.08 473 .4
1978 124,491 4150.00 516.6
Source: Department of Labour, Mine Labour Organization 
Annual Reports, the Financial Mail.
1. I assume that all Lesotho migrants recruited by the 
mines were actually employed in the gold mines. This is 
not an unreasonable assumption bearing in mind that on 
average, gold mines absorb over 70% of mine recruits.
f/-, Qniith Africa in the form oi 
Drofi'ts°ofLhe^iining industry. Table 13 shows that 
in 1979. Lesotho contributed RS16.6 million to the 
total working profits of South Africa’s mining industry. 
Lesotho does not gain from this appropriation either 
in the form of increased employment or dividend., 
or taxes According to the Labour Agreement signed 
in 1963 between South Africa and Lesotho, the employment 
of Basotho in South Africa is controlled by South 
Africa in terms of numbers as well as choice o l  j o d  
and level of wages. Even if the agreement provides^ 
for the appointment of a Labour Representative (article 
1), the functions of such representative (article2) 
are limited to the collection ol deferred pay and 
remittances, as well as ensuring that the mines 
have a smooth supply of labour. The agreement docs 
not give him even a limited degree of mandate to 
negotiate for higher wages or better working conditions.
3.5.2. Additional Losses in the Migrant Labour______
Market: The Supply Side.
It has been shown above that some migrants do not 
go through the normal recruiting channels and others 
will renew their contracts while in South Africa 
until the expiration of their passports. All these, 
estimated by the Labour Department to be a very signifi­
cant proportion of the total supply, are not attested.
The Lesotho Government collects an attestation fee 
of R12.0 per recruit, so the loss in terms of fees 
foregone (not estimated) is quite significant. This 
loss in revenue is much higher if one considers the 
fact that migrants earnings are not taxed. At an 
average income tax rate of 20%, the revenue foregone 
in respect of migrants employed at the mines was 
of the order of R41.7 million in 1979.
The motive force of migrant labour is the increasing 
effort-price of agricultural production which itself 
was a result of the expropriation of Basotho from 
their rich agricultural land by Boers in 1886-7.
With the system of migrant labour, women now play 
a very significat. role in agriculture. In 1956 , 
it was estimated that nearly 3/4 of those engaged 
in agriculture were w o m e n ^ . LASA estimates that 
about /O-o of the farm households are managed by w o m e n ^  
Their analysis oi the relationship between migrant 
manpower exports" to South Africa and agricultural 
production gives the following results:
Economic Survey Mission, ODM, Oct. 1965
34. Wykstra, R . A. "Farm Labour in Lesotho: Scarcit-v 
or Surplus? Lasa Discussion Paper No. 5, Min. 
oi Agriculture, Sept. 1978.
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It is clear therefore that the process of migration, by 
removing experienced farm managers of able-bodied men 
and substituting them with women who are already overbur­
dened with a multitude of roles, effectively transforms 
a significant portion . of Lesotho's agricultural output 
into South African profits. This loss to Lesotho includes 
outlays relating to preparatory education. In 1977, 
it was founds that 31% of the migrants had standard 4 or higher level 
of e d u c a t i o n ^ .  There is no arrangement at all ior 
the compensation of this outlay which involved more 
than 38,200 migrants in 1981.
3.5.3 Additional Losses in the Migrant Labour Market:
The Demand Side.
Lung and Skin diseases are very common mine hazards.
These and other mine-related diseases were responsible 
for 27.6% of mine deaths in 1981J6. In general, mine 
labour is a risky business, claiming an average of
2.5 lives per 1000 employees. Because there is no 
comprehensive medical insurance for foreign mine workers, 
Lesotho bears all the accident and sickness "insurance" 
costs in check by those who remain in Lesotho, largely women.
The process of migration is largely responsible for 
the creation of attitudes which do not support the 
development of Lesotho. Migration is associated with 
consumption patterns and preferences which are incongruent 
to the supply situation in Lesotho, and since this 
can only be satisfied frcm massive imports from South 
Africa, migration should be seen as largely responsible 
for the chronic visible trade deficit suffered by Lesotho..
In this way, Lesotho suffers the loss of support for 
the development, of local productive capacity.
35. ILO/NUL Migration Study.
36. Bureau of Statistics Annual Statistical Bulletin,
322 248 190 133
34 51 87 120
738 797 856 556
4.8 3.4 2.4 2
4.0 1 n v i s i bles and Leakages from the Lesotho— L_co n o m_y
So far, only those leakages resulting from Lesotho's 
participation in the commodity and labour markets 
have been considered. These leakages are, however, 
strongly associated with leakages found in the 
realm of invisibles. 4 o be discussed below 
is the integration of Lesotho's monetaiy and 
financial markets with those of South Africa 
as well as Lesotho's public sector. Very little 
information exists on the former, as well as 
on a number of other invisibles eg. insurance, 
technical assistance expenditures, freight etc.
This is due to the fact that their significance 
in terms of impact on the economy (except technical 
assistance) is somewhat small.
4.1 Lesotho's Monetary System
Part I of this report (section 8.0) gave a brief
monetary history of Southern Africa and attempted
to show how monetary arrangements in Southern Africa 
opprate and in the South African - dominated 
Rand Monetary Area. Like Swaziland, Lesotho 
has utilized Section 2 of Article 2 of the RMA.
In 1978, the Lesotho Government passed legislation^7
establishing a Monetary Authority (LMA) with 
the following functions:
(i) to issue and redeem notes and coins;
(ii) to promote and maintain internal and
external monetary stability, an efficient 
payments mechanism and the liquidity, 
solvency, and proper functioning of 
a soundly based monetary and financial 
system in Lesotho; and
(ij.i) to foster monetary, credit and financial 
conditions conducive to the orderly, 
balanced, and sustained economic develop­
ment of Lesotho.
The Act, however, specifically stipulates that
bv%'b1§§nX n SU?d (Maloti) sha11 bs 10<n backed > Rand, shall also not violate provisions
ol no Rand Monetary A g r e e m e n t . M a l o t i  can
amount°nfSSRGd ibf withdrawing a» equivalent amount of Rand from circulation.
3?' ofS?978.M°netary Authorlt* Act No. 13
38. Sections 22 (2) and 33.
39. Section 32.
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Thn net effect of this limitation is that the
Inpn?y of currency by the LMA is automatic with
the change in the flow of external iunds, ic
the currency issued is automatic and not discretionary
Of interest, however, is a wide raap  of powers 
conferred on the RMA by the Act These include 
setting ceilings on the required reserves of 
banks and other financial institutions, regulation , 
of interest and credit, control of foreign assets 
holdings, advice to government, and performance 
of incipient functions of banker-ol - last-resort.
It is worth evaluating what qualitative changes 
have resulted from the introduction of this 
legislation. Of course, the apparent observation 
is that policy makers have no more power than 
in the original situation where Lesotho was 
in the monetary circulation area of the Rand.
However, a deeper analysis shows steps in the 
positive direction.
For the first time, there is a deep analysis 
of monetary affairs, and continuous research 
and policy recommendations to government.4b 
In addition, foreign reserves which were held 
solely by commercial banks are now channelled 
through the LMA and invested as a block by the 
latter. Commercial banks are now required by 
law 41 to maintain minimum local assets amounting 
to 85% of the total value of their liabilities 
in Lesotho, the required paid-up capital, and 
the reserve account. This means-that a pool 
of liquidity is now possible in the economy.
The pooling of earnings and reserves makes 
it possible to have a diversified portfolio 
of foreign reserves, and thus offers chances 
for maximising interest rate earnings by investing 
in countries vrhere interest rates are more attractive, 
as well as possibilities for exchange rate specula­
tion. In other words, Lesotho can now spread 
the risk of exchange rate instability by holding 
a diversified portfolio of reserves. It can 
now make direct payments in non-Rand currencies.
Legislatively, the L M A ^  is aimed at being an 
instrument of achieving economic automony through 
tie use of internal monetary policy, the development 
of inward-ortented financial institutions, and 
some degree of control of the external sector 
roug re series and exchange rate management..
40
41 P ^ Cent[aJ Bank °r Lesotho Quarterly Reviews. Financial Institutions Regulations, 1981 
(Legal Notice No. of 1981)
42' P v L t?fme? T5e Contral Ba,lk of Lesotho.it its functions have not changed.
A
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« ,^ i nnt inn of success or f ci i 1 u r gBefore making an evaluati on o necessaryin the objectives of the LMA, it is necessary 
to make a critical review of the monetary arrange-
ment.
Under an automatic currency issue, the Lesotho 
Government is deprived of the opportunity to 
finance a deficit by borrowing at a lower cost 
from the LMA. This is because there is no part 
of Maloti currency which is backed by the Lesotho 
Government securities (ie no fiduciary issue).
Since this is a very attractive short-term 
alternative to direct taxation, Lesotho toregoes 
a real potential resource. In many African 
countries, this has been found to be at least 
22.1% of the Central Bank claims.40 This would 
represent Ml9.42 million in March 1 983. On 
the other hand, and as is the practice with^ 
many central banks .assuming a ceiling of 20a 
of average annual revenue for the past three 
years, it means Lesotho is currently foregoing 
a potential borrowing capacity of M29.29 million, 
or 75% of the projected deficit in 1983/84.
Even if a large part of maloti currency is imported 
by giving up real resources to South Africa, 
there is an "internalized" currency which circulates 
purely as a medium of exchange and will never 
be presented for conversion into foreign currency. 
The Rand that is backing this type of issue 
is as good as hoarded. This represents a loss 
in potential funds to finance development expendi­
ture as well as in employment creation and possible 
additional national income. Generally estimated 
at 25% of the total currency in circulation, 
"internalized" currency was more than 4.5 million 
in March, 1983.
The automatic monetary system deprives Lesotho 
of effective monetary policy neasures which 
may be required to stimulate and stabilize the 
economy especially through exchange rate insulation 
of the economy from foreign disturbance. It 
may be argued that it is doubtful if Lesotho 
could make use of such an instrument, judging 
rom the fact that instruments like moral suation, 
directives, legislation relating to interest 
rates, reserve requirements, local assets ratios 
credit^ ceilings; and taxation or subsidization, 
are ..here out nave been passively used It 
is, however pertinent to note that Lesotho
A f r i r ^ 1 suJ)Stantlal resources through South 
African exchange rate changes which arc only
43. Muzorewa. B C. "A discretionary Monetary 
System for Lesotho,  b e n e f i t  Cost Analysis'
, nrnnmti nn of the South African relevant to the promotion 01
economy.
as:
R = M/p x dP/p
where R = inflation tax paid to South Africa 
M= nominal money stock held by the
public in Lesotho,
P = the price level, and
dP/p == the rate of inflation.
Table 14 shows that using constant 1975 prices, 
Lesotho has lost an average of M10.68 million 
a year from 1968 to 1982. This represents 27.5% 
of the projected deficit for 1983/84.
It should be noted that Lesotho still has no 
effective lander - of - last resort. This lack 
of a re-discounting facility possibly explains 
why (other than the Lesotho Bank) (indigenous) 
financial institutions have developed slowly. 
Because of this lack of a true and effective 
lender-of-last-resort, the Government has often 
found itself in an embarrasing situation of 
illiquidity caused by delays in the payment 
of quarterly customs revenues by South Africa 
from the SACUA pool, and by delays in disbursement 
by donors for projects where payments are made 
on a claim basis.44 In addition, because of 
its simplicity, the automatic monetary system 
will not enable Lesotho citizens to acquire 
skills required to manage a central banking 
system.
Lesotho also foregoes the possibility of earning 
revaluation profits that could accompany well- 
managed foreign reserves in a discretionary
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TABLE 14
LESOTHO: PAYMENT OF INFLATION 
TAX TO SOUTH AFRICA
(CONSTANT 1975 Rmillion)
Year
(Y)
Nominal
Money
(M)
Price
Level
(P)
Real
Money
(M/P)
I nflat ion
Rate
(dP/p)
Inf 1 at 
Tax
(T)
1978 102.48 1.4025 73.07 0.113 8.26
1979 125.87 1.6120 78.08 0.149 11.63
1980 145.71 1.8745 77.73 0.163 12 .91
1981 171.82 2.1820 78.74 0.164 12.91
1982 184.90 2.4080 76.79 0.104 7.95
Source: Calcualted from money and price data in
Quarterly Review, Central Bank of Lesotho 
March, 1983.
Notes:
1. Money (M) is defined as Maloti and Rand with 
the public together with all bank deposits of 
the private sector and statutory _ bodies.
2. The Price level (P) is the Lesotho retail price 
indices for all items with 1975 set = 1.00.
3. lhe Inflation rate (dP/p) is the proportional 
increase in P over the previous year.
4. The Price indices used are those for all urban 
areas.
T A B L E  15
BANK DEPOSITS1 AND COMMERCIAL BANK'S 
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR AND STATUTORY
BODIES
(Mmillion)
1981 1982 1983
DEC. MARCH JUNE SEPT. DEC. MARCH
Deposits 134.3 147.8 159.7 159.3 167.7 181.6
(a) Private Sector 90.7 ' 98.2 TfflTff 93.8 106.6
(i) Demand and 
call 38.7 42.6 43.8 33.2 37.3 38.8
(ii) Savings 41.7 4 5,0 46.6 48,6 48.3 51.8
(iii) Time 10.3 10.6 ‘ 11.4 12.0 14.2 15.4
(b) Statutory Bodies 7.4 9.3 10.5 14.0 17.5 21.8
(c) Deferred Pay^ 36.2 40.3 47.4 51.5 50.4 53.8
Credit 47.6 53.4 59.5 57.0 57.9 56.4
(a) Private Sector 37.2 43.3 47.0 45.1 47.0 42.5
(i) Businesses 28.5 34.0 36.2 35.4 36.3 30.5
(ii) Households 8,7 9,3 10,8 9.7 10.9 12.0
(b) Statutory Bodies 10.4 10.1 12.5 11.9 10.9 13.9
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho: Quarterly Review, March 1983.
Notes:
1. Excluding Government.
2. Deposits of contract migrants. This item should be treated as part of private 
sector deposits.
TABLE 16
BANK DEPOSITS AND COMMERCIAL BANK'S CLAIMS
Dec
1981 - 1983
1981
March
(Mmil1 ion) 
June
1982
Sept. Dec.
1983
Marc
Deposits 146.7 161.5 172.6 171.8 180.2 190.8
Private Sector 126.9 138.5 149.2 145.3 150.2 159.8
Statutory Bodies 7.4 9.3 10.5 14.0 17.5 21.8
Government 12.4 13.7 12.9 12.5 12.5 9.2
Credit 77.9 90.7 106.6 82.7 123.3 103.8
Private Sector 37.2 43.3 47.0 45.1 47.0 42.5
Statutory Bodies 10.4 10.1 12.5k 11.9 10.9 13.9
Government 42.7 51.0 60.0 60.2 54.5 56.6
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho Quarterly Review, March 1983.
COMMERCIAL BANKS’ MAJOR RATIOS 1978-1983 
(M Million)
TAtfLU 1 /
End of Deposits Loans and Credit- Liquid Liquidity Long-term Ratio of
Period C D Advances Depos it Assets Rat io T ime Long-term
(2) Ratio (3) (4) (5) Deposits Deposits
(6) to Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 6
1978 65.12 39.44 60.6 34.28 52.6 7.82 12.1
1979 83.99 49.96 59.5 47.06 56.0 8.26 9.8
1980 99.86 69.09 69.2 60.21 60.3 7.76 7.8
1981
March 105.92 77.40 73.1 74.48 70.3 8.43 8.0
June 102.06 83.81 .82.1 65.14 63.8 7.92 7.8
September 100.02 90.64 90.6 63.53 63.5 6.17 6.2
December 110.46 90.25 81.7 82.85 75.0 6.28 5.7
1982
March 121.23 104.39 86.1 79.30 65.4 6.19 5.1
June 125.25 119.39 95.3 84.30 67.3 8.72 7.0
September 120.38 117.17 97.3 97.45 81.0 11.74 9.8
December 129.77 112.39 86.6 106.23 81.9 8.39 6.5
1983
MJanuary 133.37 107.32 80.5 '114.50 85.9 9.09 6.8
February 137.25 108.41 79.0 121.84 88.8 8.39 6.1
March 136.94 112.97 82 . 5 114.38 83.5 8.67 6.3
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho.
(1) Excludes Deferred Pay Fund and deposits of non-residents.
(2) Excludes loans and advances to non-residents. Includes Treasury Bills held by banks.
(3) Column 2 as percentage of column 1.
(4) Covers cash reserves, call or demand deposits with banks in RMA, and short-term government securities
(5) Column 4 as percentage of column 1. - , ,
(6) Time deposits with a tern of more than esix months, as defined in Financial Institutions Act c
Deferred lay Fund dopants are excluded.
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TABLE 18
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL BANK'S CREDIT1 
(M Million)
1981 1982 1983 (March)
M. % M % M %
Mining 2.6 7 5.0 12 .6 1
Manufacturing 3.0 9 4.1 10 4.2 10
Construction 5.0 14 2.7 6 2.2 5
Other Development Sector 2.9 8 4.8 11 7.1 19
Distributive Services 18.6 53 23.9 55 24.1 59
Other Services 3.0 9 2.6 6 2.4 6
Total 35.1 100 43.1 100 40.6 100
Sources: Central Bank of Lesotho: Quarterly Review Volume II
No. 1, March 1983.
1. Excludes Government.
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Table 18 shows the distribution of commercial 
credit. More than 50% of credit goes to support 
distributive services. This sector is not only 
dominated by South African traders, transport, 
and goods, but becomes one of the major channels 
of channelling funds out of Lesotho through monopoly 
pricing,inflation, profits repatriation, as well 
as through undermining the productive potential 
in Lesotho and increasing the propensity to import 
consumption goods. The distribution sector's 
favourable position in the banking system comes 
from the fact that it has short-term, quick returns, 
is less risky, and is closely tied to the South 
African economy. It is thus obvious that the 
automatic currency system has done little to re­
orient the banking sector. Substantial funds 
still find their way out of the country.
It should thus be stated that Lesotho benefits 
substantially from its membership of the RMA through 
pooling of the foreign exchange reserves in the 
monetary union, guaranteed foreign exchange allocation 
from the South African Reserve Bank, and revenue 
from compensation for Rand in circulation. •
It has been shown above that the open money market 
carries with it a drain on Lesotho's funds which 
probably substantially outweigh the benefits.
It is obvious that a discretionary monetary system^ 
might be more beneficial since it would permint 
the economy to fully exploit the potential money 
base which is already implicit in the present 
automatic monetary arrangement. However, given 
the conditions of dependency - the weakness of 
the local productive economy, the commodity trade 
imbalance, heavy reliance on migrant remittances 
in an unstable labour market, a high propensity 
to import, an inadequate domestic resource base 
for local revenue instruments - there will certainly 
be a limit as to the degree of monetary independence.
4: 2 Leakages Through The Financial system
The integration of Lesotho into the financial 
system of South Africa dates back to the beginning 
of the 20th century. The Union Post Office Savings 
Bank was granted sole right to collect savings 
from Lesotho in 19114'
46. ie Withdrawal from the RMA
47. Muzorewa, B.C. "The Development of the Monetary 
and Financial System in Lesotho" Ford Research 
Project, NUL/CPDO, February, 1979.
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The net effect of this joint colonial South African 
decision was a repatriation of surplus funds from 
Lesotho to South Africa as well as lower interest 
accruals to Lesotho citizens (banking in Lesotho), 
made possible by lack of competition. It also 
discouraged the development of indigenous savings 
institutions. It is not possible to establish 
the exact magnitude of interest costs to Lesotho, 
but it iskriown that in 1966, UPOSB collected M887 , 448 
deposits from Lesotho citizens (residents). There 
is no record of this institution being involved 
in any medium or long-term projects during this 
period. The amount of leakages involved in the 
UPOSB operations can only be seen against contributions 
that were made by the Lesotho Post oOffice Savings 
Bank (LPOSB) which replaced UPOSB in May 1966.
(
LPOSB existed between 1966 and 1971 and by this 
time, commercial banks were already active in 
Lesotho, thus, forcing it to pay a competitive 
interest rate of 4% on savings d e p o s i t s 1^ .  What 
is interesting from Tables 19 and 20 is that by 
1966 the savings bank invested zero percent of 
their funds either to Government or to LNDC.
However, in 1971, the share of these two in LPOSB's 
total investments was 85.1%. Up to 1966 therefore 
the leakage in ivestment funds was 100% .
Until 1972, there were only two commercial banks 
in Lesotho which were privately-owned foreign 
multinational banking companies. Standard Bank 
of South Africa Ltd (now Standard Bank Ltd) was 
formed in 1907, while Barclays Bank D.C.O. (now 
Barclays Bank International) was formed in 1957.
•Until 1973, these banks operated in a policy 
vacuum and developed leakage trends whose 
characteristics and effects are still traceable 
in the banking sector in Lesotho today. They 
were not active in the field of savings mobilization 
since their operations were limited to the urban 
areas, and also, since they required very high 
minimum deposits for new accounts in a country 
marked by general poverty ^9# In 1971, the two 
banks collected 80% of the total deposits in the 
country. However, in March 1967, their loan/deposit 
ratio was only 13%.50 Even if one allowed them 
very high cash-reserves ratios, the only reasonable 
assumption is that their deposits were invested 
outside Lesotho.
*48. LPOSB collected savings deposits, not fixed 
time deposits.
49. The minimum savings deposit at Standard Bank 
is M50.00.
50. Muzorewa, B.C. op cit..
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THE LESOTHO SAVINGS BANK ACCOUNTS 
1966 - 1971
TABLE 19
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Balance due to depositors (M'000) 880 1014 1041 992 963 1026
Transfers from S. Africa (M 1000) 887 178 71 28 19 18
Value of Active Accounts (M'000) 11 14 16 17 19 22
Average Amount/depositor 84 72 65 58 51 46
% interest on dep. acc. 4 4 4 4 4 4
Investments (M’000) 837 1015 1015 1015 995 1081
% interest on investiment (Ave.) 6 6.25 6.5 6.25 6.25 6.25
Source: LPOSB: Annual Reports and Accounts, 1966 - 71 in
in Muzorewa, B.C. op cit.
TABLE 20
LPOSB DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT 
(Percentage)
Borrower 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Lesotho Government - 17.2 17.2 31.5 32.2 29.6
LNDC - - - 23.0 60.5 55.5
Commercial Banks 60.6 69.0 65.1 45.5 7.5 12.5
S.A. National Industrial
Credit Corporation 30.4 13.8 17.7 - - -
Total (M'000) 837 1015 1015 1015 995 1081
Source: Culculated from LPOSB: Annual Reports and Accounts,
1966 - 1971 by Muzorewa , BC. op cit.
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The short-comings of these foreign banks was recognized shortly 
after independence. It became evident that a national bank 
whose objectives wore congruent with national goals was necessary. 
The Government thus established the Lesotho Bank-National 
Development Bank by Order No. 8 of 1971. Among many, 
its terms of reference were as follows:
; I' •
Mobilization of savings in the country with . r , 
particular emphasis on the rural communities; , •
Making loans and advances to industry, trade, 
agriculture and other development projects >
in the country bearing in mind the needs to 
recircle the funds back to the rural communities 
which supply them; and
Endeavour to assist Basotho to establish themselves 
in the various fields of commerce and industry.
The Lesotho Bank is wholly-owned by Government, and according 
to the First-Five-Year Development Plan, it was supposed 
to be active and create domestic demand for credit by 
assisting in the formulation of project proposals. There 
are indications that the Lesotho Bank has successfully 
executed its first term of reference. The Bank's total 
deposits rose from M4 million in 1973 to M121 million 
in 1982.51 it has increased its branch network tremendously 
by penetrating very remote areas. Its success was re­
inforced by the Deferred Pay Act of 1974 which compels 
all Lesotho citizens engaged with the mining industry 
in South Africa to remit 60% of their wages to be kept 
by the Lesotho Bank until the conclusion of their contracts.
Thus, it can safely be said that the Lesotho Bank has 
demonstrably reduced the wastage of financial resources, 
thus releasing a lot of resources for development.
A glance at table 21 shows a remarkable shift of balance 
in the Lesotho banking sector. However, the amazing 
fact is that despite this success, the Government still 
banks with the Standard Bank. An examination of Table 
22 confirms the Lesotho Bank's assestion that "Lesotho 
Bank became a pioneer investor in areas w’hich were considered 
risky and dangerous by other b a n k s ’.'52 e structure 
of the Bank's management has been more aggressive in 
their investment behaviour and thus less subject to risk 
aversion than foreign owned banks. This is seen by ventures 
into fixed assets and buildings and loans to government 
and statutory bodies.
51. Lesotho Business, Jan. - Feb. 1983
52. Lesotho Business, Jan. - F e b .  1983
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
TABLE 21
LESOTHO BANK’S POSITION IN 
THE LESOTHO BANKING SECTOR, 
19811 (M Million)
ITEM ALL BANKS LESOTHO
Rand
BANK
%
Non-fixed Assets 155.6 100.2 64.4
Total deposits^ 115.6 63.0 54.4
Fixed Assets 14.8 11.3 76.7
Total Assets 173.9 111.5 64.1
Total Advances^ 68.6 41.2 60.1
Balances with Central Bank^ 75.6 50.9 67.4
Source: Lesotho Bank Statement to mark the 10th Anniversary, Ja
January, 1983.
Notes:
1. Figures rounded up.
2. Excludes deferred pay.
3. Includes loans.
4. Includes Short-term Investments.
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TABLE 22
ASSETS: LESOTHO BANK, 1973-19761
(M Million)
Assets
Investments
Cash & Bank Balances
Advances to Customers
Loans to Gvt. 8c Statutory
Bodies
Investment in Fixed Ass. 8c 
Building Projects 
Interest in Subsidiaries 
Costomer's Liabilities 
Per Contra 
Total
1975 1974 1975 1976
2.15 0.06 4.07 4.00
0.28 1.10 3.67 7.20
2.00 0.90 1.48 4.75
- 2.47 3.27 4.18
0.96 2.18 3.04 4.38
- - - 0.21
0.03 0.22 0.35 0.29
5.17 6.93 16.24 24. 9
Source: Lesotho Bank, Annual Reports, 1973 - 76.
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It will be interesting, therefore, to examine if there 
has been a pervassive change in the banking sector which 
has been introduced by the Lesotho Bank, and if so, what 
the situation of leakages is like in the face of these 
changes. G r a y 5 5  used the IMF international Financial 
Statistics to gather data on 37 African countries for 
the purpose of computing indices of the commercial bank 
lending behaviour and deposit structure. .The results 
are shown on Table 23 Indices (i) to (iii) measure 
the degree of participation of the commercial banking 
sectors in their domestic economies. Index (iv) measures 
the extent of finaincial intermediation by commercial 
banks, and index (v) gives a crude measure of the stability 
of the deposit base.
Gray's results show an abnormally low-level of participation 
by commercial banks in Lesotho's domestic economy.Lesotho 
also shows the lowest ratio of private sector lending 
to total financial assets. On the other hand, Lesotho 
had the^highest ratio of foreign to total financial assets 
(44.2%)54. in addition, Lesotho commercial banks had 
a very low-level of intermediation marked by massive 
net absorption of private funds. The share of demand 
deposits in the total deposit base of these banks is. 
very low ijz they have a high share of savings and fixed 
deposits in their total private deposit base. These 
results are very significant if it is borne in mind that 
1977 was a year of high economic activity, with a sudden 
increase in ' migrants remittances and aid inflows.
These results show that the banking system in Lesotho 
fails to function as an effective financial intermediary, 
and the reason ; can only be found in the abnormally 
high degree of Structural dependency of the Lesotho economy 
in general and financial system specifically.
The commercial banks in Lesotho maintained chronic excess 
liquidity even in circumstances which allowed them to 
use their overseas head offices 55 as well as the South 
African Reserve Bank 56 as lenders - of - last - resort.
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions noted that 
excess liquidity was maintained at more than^l00% greater 
than the minimum liquid assets requirement.57 This observation 
sheds a lot of doubt whether the presence of a Central 
Bank would make a difference.
53. Gray, J.G. "The lending behaviour and Deposit Base 
of the Commercial Banks in Lesotho - A comparison 
with 37 countries, Ford Research Project, NUL/CPDO, 
April, 1979.
54. It should be borne in mind that some countries place ceilings 
on the amount of foreign asset holdings of commercial banks.
However, the difference in this statist c is quite significant.
55. This applies to Standard and Barclays Banks only.
56. Utilizing the Rand Monetary Agreement of 1974.
57. Report of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, 1977.
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TABLE 23
COMPARISON OF LENDING BEHAVIOUR AND DEPOSIT 
BASE COMPOSITION FOR 37 AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
WITH LESOTHO (IFS REPORT FIGURES, 1977)
INDEX 
(Rat io)
RANGE 
(37 Count.)
MEAN 
(37 Count.)
LESOTHO 
(Dec. 77)
Total Domestic Lending 
To Total Bank Fin. 
Assets (i)
48.3%-97.1% 82.08% 49.3%
Private Sector Lending 
to Total Bank Fin. 
Assets (ii) 24 . 9%-92.1% 67.1% 24.5%
Foreign Assets/Total 
Financial Assets (iii) 0 .1%-28.5% 7.64% 44.2%
Private Sector Lending 
to Private Sector 
Deposits (iv) 34 . 7%-353.0% 113.6% 34.7%
Demand Deposits to 
Total Private Deposits^ 
(v)
28 . 5%-92.1% 62.4% 39.1%
Source: Gray, NUL/CPDO, 1979.
1. Note that some countries place ceilings to holdings 
by Comm, banks.
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In granting loans to applicants, banks use standard 
criteria of collateral, maturity of applicants, risk, 
repayment period, etc. These are standards only 
suitable for a more developed economy like that of 
South Africa. As a result, they have always claimed
that there are no "bankable projects" in Lesotho.
This is complicated by the fact that, as will be 
shown below, interest rates in Lesotho banks are closely 
set against those in South Africa. The profit-maximizing 
behaviour by the Lesotho banks demands an equalization 
of marginal returns in Lesotho and South Africa (after 
allowing for higher "perceived" risk in Lesotho).
This is made possible by the free flow of funds within 
the Rand Monetary Area. In addition, the banks are
not aggressive in mobilizing loan customers and do
not have specialized staff to assist in the formulation 
and appraisal of "bankable projects," ie they are 
passive and not "supply-lending".58
In 1973, the Lesotho Government enacted the first 
l e g i s l a t i o n ^  to attempt to curb the outflow of funds.
This Act. which excepted the Lesotho Bank, stipulates 
a minimum capital requirement of R100,000 or 5% of 
liabilities in Lesotho as qualification of bank registra­
tion in Lesotho. It further stipulates the creation 
of a Reserve Account in each bank into which 50% of 
the net profit will be paid before repatriation or 
paying of dividends.60 The minimum capital requirements 
were set at R50,000 or 5% of the liabilities or R200.000 
or 20% of the liabilities for other financial institutions 
There was a further stipulation that the Government 
could require a financial institution to invest in 
Lesotho up to 5% of its liabilities, and to maintain 
local assets consisting of claims payable in Lesotho 
equivalent to the value of its liabilities to
the public in Lesotho or to the sum of the minimum 
paid-up capital and the Reserve Account.
There is no evidence that the Government ever used 
these discretionary powers. The Insurance Act. 1976 
is also coached on the same lines except that insurance 
companies were for the first time required to invest 
in Lesotho in assets equivalent to the amount required 
to meet their liabilities and the amount required 
to meet the liability on account of matured claims 
under life insurance policies. However, the Financial 
Institutions Regulations, 1981 increased the minimum 
local assets requirement to "not less than eighty- 
five per cent of the aggregate value of its liabilities 
to the public in Lesotho and its required paid up 
capital and reserve account."
58.
59.
60.
Muzorewa, B.C. op cit.
Financial Institutions Act, (No. 23) 1973.
When the reserve account lises to 50% of the 
minimum capital requirement, this contribution 
into it from net profit falls to 25%.
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This new requirement, however, seems to apply to banks 
only.
It is thus clear that the Government in its legislation 
has avoided a direct confrontation with the foreign- 
owned financial institutions, perhaps for fear to cause 
chaos in the financial system. They have, however, chosen 
to work indirectly by creating two additional financial 
institutions aimed at mobilizing local resources for 
development in the country.6-*-. However, a cursory analysis 
of the investments financed by these institutions shows 
that they are heavy promoters of inputs imported from 
South Africa.^2 The curbing of financial exports to 
South Africa is not even given prominence in the Lesotho 
Monetary Act, 1978. The irony of the whole story is 
that the government banks with the standard Bank Limited, 
a foreign-owned bank. It does not seem the local licensing 
of banks has done much in the way of dealing with financial 
leakages.
Table 24 shows a dramatic divergence between interest
rates charged to borrowers (thus making credit very expensive)
and the interest rates they pay to holder of time deposits.
The average margins were 7.9% in 1981, 9.6% in 1982 and
11.5% in 1983. The situation is worse when savings deposits 
of the private sector are considered. These amounted 
to M41.7 million in December 1981 and 48.3 million in 
December 1981 and M48.3 million by the end of 1982.
House-hold savings alone amounted to 92.4% in 1981, 
and 98.2% in 1982 respectively of the total private sector
savings.63
These figures _ serve to underline the importance of 
household savings as contributors to total funds available 
to lend. However, the maximum interest rate paid on 
these (6% in 1983) contasts sharply with the miximum 
lending rate (20% in 1983), a serious revelation of contra­
dictions in the financial system.
The above analysis attempts to demonstrate that banks 
in Lesotho (and many financial institutions) are guided 
by the profit motive. Higher interest rates on saving would be 
commensurate with the objective of mobilization of wasted 
resources. However, this would reduce the profit margin 
of the banks.
61. See the Lesotho Building Finance Corporation Act, 
1976, and Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank
. A c t , 1976.
62. Largely building materials, heavy machinery and 
fertilizers.
63. When miner's dcfferred pay deposits are included 
the these percentages are lower.
TABLE 24
INTEREST RATES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS, PRIVATE SECTOR
1978 - 1983 
Per Cent, Per Annum
Interest Charged to Borrowers Interest Paid to Depositors
End of Minimum Maximum Savings Deposits Time 
Minimum Maximum Minimum
Depos its 
Maximum
1978 11.0 16.0 3.5 7.0 3.0 8.0
1979 11.0 16.0 3.5 5.0 3.5 7.5
1980 11.0 16.0 2.5 5.0 2.0 7.5
1981
M arch 11.0 16.0 2.5 5.0 2.0 7.5
June 13.0 17.5 2.5 6.0 9.0 10.0
September 15.0 18.0 5.0 6.0 9.0 10.5
December 15.0 18.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 10.5
1982
January 15.0 18.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 10.5
February 15.0 20.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 12.0
March 15.0 22.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 12.0
April 15.0 22.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 12.0
May 16.5 22.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 12.0
June 18.0 22.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 . 12.0
July 18.0 22.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 12.0
August 18.0 22.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 12.0
September 18.0 21.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 12.0
October 18.0 21.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 11.0
November 17.0 21.0 5.0 6.0 8.5 11.0
December 17.0 21.0 5.0 6.0 8.5 11.0
1983
January 17.0 20.0 5.0 6.0 5.3 10.5
February 15.0 20.0 4.0 6.0 3.5 9.0
March 14.0 20.0 4..0 6.0 3.5 6.0
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho
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To make matters worse, there is a visible absence of 
foreign-owncd banks in remote areas inside the country.
These have mainly been limited to urban areas or foreign- 
dominated enclaves. The real explanation for the apparent 
lack of credit outlets lies in the existence of interest 
rates set in the core of the monetary area (South Africa) 
which prevent the local financial market from clearing 
without exporting funds to the core.
In contusion, it should be stated that the structure 
and performance of commercial banks in Lesotho is so 
far incompatible with the savings mobilization'philosophy 
and they find it difficult to develop inward or development- 
oriented policies because of the structural dependency 
of the financial system. This conclusion applies to 
theLesotho Bank as well. Even if it has been very successful 
in the mobilization of savings by establishing branches' 
in the rural areas, the structure of its interest rates 
and loans distribution are determined by the financial 
core. This analysis has not gone into the field of 
insurance and credit companies. These are largely foreign- 
owned and have their headquarters in South Africa.64 
Insurance, policies are accepted and premiums fixed in 
South Africa. Transfer payments are immediate through 
the banks.65 Credit is approved in South Africa where 
there are financiers of credit companies which sell goods 
from their mother companies in South Africa. This financial 
dependency will be very difficult to fight as long as 
there is a free .flow of financial resources in the
sub-region made possible by Lesotho's membership of the 
Rand Monetary Area.
4.5 Leakages from The Public Sector
Structural dependency has had very pervasive implications 
for economic management in Lesotho. We have seen that 
various structural,deficiencies and bottlenecks facing 
the socio-economic system have prevented the optimum 
allocation of resources. What is evident is that the 
ext ernal/doniest ic resources ratio of the development 
budget has increased considerably since independence, 
reaching a record 2.82 in 1 9 8 2 /8 3 ^^. it must be ^ e m p h a s i ­
zed from the very onset, however, that heterogeneous 
and uncertain data makes reliable quantitative analysis 
of the financial performance of the public sector in 
Lesotho difficult. An analysis of the current revenue 
performance of the economy leads one to conclude that 
various sources of development financing were by passed
64. Except the Lesotho National Insurance Company.
65. The. official view is tl\at many Basotho as well as _ f ore igne r s
living in Lesotho maintain bank accounts in South
Africa.
66. This ratio has slightly fallen to . o in Lite 1983/84 
budget. If directly-funded projects are included, the 
ratios increase to 4.21 and 3.75 t 1982/83 and 1983/84
respectively. The slight improvement in the 1983/84
budget is the result of the adoption ol austerity 
measures, particularly in the recui:ent budget.
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in financial plans in favour of external resources 
especially that external aid is quicker to mobilize.
This ratio of external/domestic resources could 
probably be lower.
Following the renegotiation of the Customs Union 
Agreement in 1969, customs revenues together with 
migrant labour earnings and remittances became a 
major source of economic growth. A further stimulus 
was given by the political crisis of the closure 
of the Lesotho-Transkei border in 1976/77 which 
resulted in a stream of aid inflows. However, "virtually 
none of the expenditures financed by borrowings 
have created a revenue flow back to the Treasury 
to assist with the servicing and repayment of the 
b o r r o w i n g " .67 Most of the expenditure for this 
period went into the generation of infrastructure 
(especially roads and buildings)and into social 
services.
The second consequence of increased migrant earnings^ 
remittances, customs revenues and aid inflows was 
the emergence of government as a major employer 
and spender. M o t t u r a 6 8  found that in developing 
countries, the high unemployment rate still exerts 
a social pressure on the public administration to 
create new jobs. This situation favours the creation 
of oversized administrative structures which usually 
require a very low investment outlay per capital 
and imply an irreversible increase in recurrent 
expenditures. By 1978, the civil service establishment 
had grown from close to 5,000 jobs in 1966 to
10,000 jobs with a further provision of up to 2,000 
daily paid j o b s . 69 The growth of government and 
the civil service during this period was evidently 
customs-revenue and aid-induced.
The net-effect of the stimuli was a feedback-effect 
on customs revenues and further dependence on this 
single source of revenue by government. The concentration 
on construction activity and the payment of salaries 
for civil servants in an economy characterised 
by undersupply caused a serious hike in the level 
of imports'^.
67. Ministry of Finance.
68. Mottura, P. "Savings Mobilization in Developing 
African Countries" in Mauri, A (ed) Mob i1i zat i on 
of 1 iousehold Savings: A Tool for DeveTopment,
Mi 11an, i 97 7.
69. Comparison of the Establishment lists. The 
vacancy rate was estimated at 20%.
70. For example, statistics show that Government 
final consumption increased progressively from 
M10.8 million in 1972/75 to M52.5 million in 
1979/80.
Table 25-
Hesources and Expenditure - 1970/71 to 1979/60 
(in Current Prices)____________
Unit : Million Maloti
Period
Resources
Total
Expenditure
G.N.P.
at
Market
Prices
Net Factor 
Income 
from 
Abroad
G.D.P.
at
Market
Pri ces
Imports of 
Goods and 
Services
Private
Consump­
tion
Govern­
ment
Consump­
tion
Gross
Capital
Forma­
tion
Export of 
Goods and 
Services
1970/71 74.8 22.3 52.5 28.6 81.1 63.2 6.2 6.0 5.7
1971/72 76.3 25.8 50.5 36.3 86.0 63.6 8.3 8.1 6.8
1972/73 95.8 31.5 64.3 52.0 116.3 85.5 10.8 9.9 10.1
1973/74 132.3 44.5 87.8 69.4 157.2 116.0 12.1 16.3 12.8
1974/75 158.1 60.1 98.0 96.1 194.1 146.9 15.8 17.3 14.1
1975/76 212.0 101.0 111.0 139.5 250.5 183.9 23.1 27.3 16.2
1976/77 269.1 125.8 143.3 191.0 >334.3 241.0 25.6 46.7 21.0
1977/78 331.4 145.0 186.4 228.4 414.8 286.5 30.5 80.2 17.6
1978/79 405.9 156.1 249.8 266.1 515.9 351.4 44 .4 79.7 40.4
1979/80 442.4 181.8 260.6 338.5 599.1 384.8 52.3 103.6 58.4
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The accrual of customs revenue and migratory labour 
benefits (wage increases) and heavy aid inflows 
were directly related to the failure of the Lesotho 
economy to retain and circulate resources within 
the economy. This loss of purchasing power manifested 
itself from the fact that imports as a percentage 
of GDP rose sharply from 61% in 1966 to 129.9% 
in 1979/80 (see Table 25) .
The combined effect of non-productive investment, 
revenue leakages and a large civil service is further 
dependence on foreign aid and customs revenues and 
remittances. In the first three years of the 3rd 
plan, the government heavily relied on short or 
medium-term borrowing at commercial rates of interest. 
Table 26 shows that the magnitude of public debt 
expenditures has risen sharply, its weight claiming 
34% of budgeted recurrent revenues for 1983/84.
The interest charge alone has risen forty-fold 
from 1978/79 to 1983/84.
If public expenditure commitments exceed expansion 
in the absolute revenue capacity of the public 
sector, the government may achieve subsequent investment 
levels only through underfinaneiang of on-going 
projects^-*-, and thus, with losses of project productivity 
and further reduction in the revenue base and increases 
in the burden of debt. In presenting the 1983/84 
estimates of revenue and expenditure, the Lesotho 
Minister of Finance, in addressing himself to the 
recurrent overexpansion, reiterated that the government 
would"see a continuation of the policy of consolidation 
and austerity.”^- We have already seen that the 
financial leakage to both the local private banking 
sector and donor sources operates through government 
indebtedness which is only part ially caused by recurrent 
overexpansion. It is therefore very doubtful if 
a mere freeze on the growth of the development and 
recurrent budgets, without complementary policies 
(eg in investment selection), will produce the desired 
results .
There are additional possible explanations to the
rapid increase in the public debt in Lesotho. The
level and composition of investment is managed by
the Central Planning and Development Office
(CPDO) while the recurrent budget is managed by
the Ministry of Finance. Their decisions arc generally
not integrated at the sectoral level.
71. Heller, P.S. "Public Investment in LDCs with 
Recurrent Cost Constraints: The Kenyan Case"
in Quarterly Journal _o1 ! < onomi cs , date?
72. Hon. K .T .J . Kakhetia F Presenting
the 1983/82 Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure 
18th April, 1983.
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Table 27 shows that even if savings could be adequate 
at the macro-level, there would be no gurantee for 
intersectoral flexibility to meet induced budgetary 
flexibility in each sector. The allocations for 
1982/83 form a good expample of disintegrated financial 
planning and possibilities for lower investment 
product iv ity.
The above problem has been worsened by the fact 
that past contractual obligations restrict the degree 
of flexibility in response to fluctuating financial 
conditions. In addition, the unwillingness of donors 
to finance the domestic component 73 of public invest­
ment (counterpart contribution) has caused a serious 
neglect of a thorough scrutiny of the recurrent 
allocation in preference for concentration on raising 
sufficient savings to "match-up". On the other 
hand, a lag (sometimes up to many years) between 
local direct financial support to the donor-funded 
development programme in the form of government 
advances on the one hand, and actual disbursements 
on the other hand has forced the government to turn 
to the commercial market and thus incur interest 
costs. Such advances against projects as well as 
to public officers (car-purchase advances) amounted 
to M l ,550,734,44 or 1.5% of the development budget 
in 1982/83.74
National accounts figures show that the national 
saving rate averaged between 6% and 7% in the period 
1972/73 to 1976/77, and reached its peak in 1979/80 
when it averaged more than 10%. Between 1979/SO 
and 1982/83, gross national savings fell by 7 6%.75 
This trend can only be understood if balanced against 
final consumption and imports figures whose sky­
rocketing only serve to underscore the amount of 
leakages into the South African economy as well 
as the chronic deficit facing the government. It 
has already been shown how the growth of the Lesotho 
economy is undermined by the price-raising effect 
of South African import controls into the Customs 
Union Area. Government final consumption, having 
increased progressively from M10.8 million in 1972/73 
to M52.3 million in 1979/80 is partly responsible 
for this loss through imports.A pertinent point to raise.here 
is that in the late seventies and early eighties, 
the Lesotho Government enacted legislation as an 
instrument of controlling the leakage of resources 
through bank financial transfers.
73. This has become a very important project selection 
criterion in CPDO.
74. This was a year of severe austerity. The % must 
have been much higher for previous years.
75. See Table 28
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TABLE 27-
COMPARISONS OF CAPITAL (DEVELOPMENT) 
AND RECURRENT ALLOCATIONS: SELECTED 
MINISTRIES 1982/83* (R Million)
MINISTRY Revenue Capital 
A1locat ion
Recurrent 
A1locat ion
Agr iculture 0.6 10.9 8.2
Health 0.7 2.7 8.0
Educat ion 1.0 1.6 23.8
Commerce &. Industry 0.8 0.9 1.2
Defence 0.1 0.4 17.8
Water, Energy, Mining 19.1 10.7 0.9
Works 0.0 13.8 9.8
Rural Development 0.0 1.6 4.2
Interior 1.1 2.4 5.1
Source: The Treasury:'
* Notes: 1. The fact that some development projects have
in-built costs has not been considered.
2. Intersectoral Projects (particularly 
buildings) have not been considered.
3. Some Ministries recurrent allocations are 
meant for development projects appearing in 
other Ministries allocations.
4. Production-functions differ from Ministry to 
Ministry although labour-using methods are gene 
rally encouraged.
t
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SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT 1979/80-1982/83 
(R million current prices)
TABLE 28
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 81982/83
Gross National Savings 82.3 63.0 33.6 19..7
Government 11.1 - 13.0 - 23.6 4..6
Private 71.2 76.0 57.2 24..3
Net Borrowing from Abroad 21.3 42.6 77.4 84..3
Gross Domestic Investment 103.6 105.6 111.0 104..0
Government 44.7 45.7 49.0 46..0
Private 58.9 59.9 62.0 58..0
Source: Ministry of Finance , Central Bank, and IMF.
However, banks have counteracted by actively financing imports of
South African goods. There is a strong possibility that
the effect of legislation has been neutralized through
an active support of different forms of leakages, and
harder ones. to fight because of the provisions of
the Customs Union Agreement.
The revenue and aid accruals of the 1970s as well as
substantial inflows of migrant earnings and the proliferation 
of projects was accompanied by "a progressive decline 
and laxity in the management of the financial affairs 
of the Government".^6 The cases cited for the period 
1975/76 to 1977/78 include lack of control over government 
transport, disregard of tenderboard procedures, loss 
of security consciousness, lack of prompt action on 
staff movements, lack of safe custody of accountable 
documents, lack of control over revenue collections, 
excessive motor mileage claims by civil servants, 
and lack of reliable records for the control of public 
assets. According to the audit report, the state of 
public accounts for these three years was "most appalling" 
and the contributory factors were as follows:
(i) Serious errors and omissions in the recording
of financial transactions and accounting 
informat ion;
(ii) Absence, in the majority of cases, of documents 
in support of recorded transactions.’
76. "Report of the Auditor-General on the Public
Accounts of Lesotho lor the ee 'teais Ended 
31st March 1978 p.5.
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(iii) Chaotic storage of accounting records and 
source documents; and 
(iv) High incidence of disagreement between financial 
statements data and the Treasury books of 
accounts.
There were vast differences during this period between 
the reconciled cash accounts and the relevant statements 
of cash balances for the three years as follows;
Financial Year 
Ended
Per Bank 
Reconciliation
Per Statement 
of Cash Balances
Progressive
Difference
March 1976 R2 , 843 , 128 R2 ,965 ,323 R. 122,195
March 1977 2,737,333 1,860,630 876,703
March 1978 4,639,674 2,170,227 2,469,447
This form of financial mismanagement is summarized by the 
Auditor-General in his statement "Widescale financial indiscipli­
ne has led to disregard of financial regulations and instruction 
and has culminated in the breakdown of accounting 
controls that has reached catastrophic dimensions in 
recent years” . Financial leakages involved during 
this period run into several million Rand and involved 
both large-scale mismanagement and embezzlement.
4.4 Foreign Aid-Related Leakages
Most of Lesotho's development projects are supported 
from massive inflows of foreign aid. As was seen above, 
the foreign/domestic resources ratio was 2.82 in 1982/83.
Local resources are generally used to provide counterpart 
contribution. Lack of highly experienced local consultants 
managers, and technicians operates to undermine the 
foreign aid multiplier. Except board and lodging, 
consultant fees hardly find their way to Lesotho, and 
for large projects, these are very significant. For 
example, the feasibility study for the proposed Highland 
Water project (of an outlay of £1.5 billion) is 
estimated at R12 million.77 Because of the shortage 
of local technical expertise, Lesotho has to resort 
to international tendering for most of the jobs requiring 
consultancy. Usually, most of the consulting engineering 
companies have subsidiaries in South Alrica who actually 
do the execution.
77. Sunday Times 25th July, 1 9 8  . The Comiiei No ^77 <
of January - February, 1983 put this cost as +_ 5 million
ECU.
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Judging from the mumber of these large scale projects 
in the development budget, the amount of foreign aid 
which leaks through this channel involves several Rmillion.
Since there is no local preference in the selection 
of tenders, large projects in Lesotho should be seen 
to lead to losses in resources in the stages of prefeasi­
bility and feasibility studies, that of contractors, 
and finally, in the stage of management contracts.
Technical assistance agreements in Lesotho amounted 
to $49 million Salaries of technical assistance
personnel do not only absorb a significant proportion 
of total development assistance but are tax-free.
At an average of 20%, this represented a loss of 
$9.8 million revenue on the part of the Lesotho Government 
in 1979. Several bilateral and multilateral agreements 
only pay a small fraction of expatriate salaries in 
local currency. The major portion is paid into bank 
accounts in international metropolises of donor countries.
The impact of expatriate salaries on the economy of
Lesotho is therefore negligible. Closely related to
this point is the question of training components of
the development programmes. In 1969 it was estimated
that 360 Basotho students ^0 were in higher eduction
institutions abroad. This represents 34.4% of those
enrolled at the local university. Most of the scholarships
offered by donor countries do not give Lesotho the
option of where to train. Because of the high cost
of education (and sometimes its irrelevance) only a
limited number of students can be trained from donor funds abroad
Several donor inputs in many development projects 
are purchased by the donors themselves. The procurement 
of these, particularly in the case of vehicles and 
equipment, bypasses the Lesotho banking system as the 
money never reaches Lesotho. Other than costs caused 
by delays in delivery, money is lost into transport.
4.5. Other Public Sector-Related Leakages
A more pervasive and, recent phenomenon is the diversion 
of development funds in order to make good damages 
to Lesotho property and installations caused by South 
Africa's acts of distabilization and sabotage against 
its neighbours. An estimated R27 million has been 
diverted from development to security. Ihe damages 
here involve attacks on water installations, fuel depots,
78. Particularly in the Hotel trade.
79. UNDP "Development Assistance; Lesotho 19/9 Maseru, 
1980.
80. JASPA Report. .
81. "Lesotho Uses Growth Funds for Security in the
Zimbabwe Herald, March 9, 1983.
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TABLE 26
GOVERNMENT PUBLIC DEBT EXPENDITURE 
1978/79 - 1983/84 
(R million)
_______________ 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/85 1983/84 *
Interest Charges (1) 0.5 1.0 4.2 8.0 16.1 20.2
Amortization (2) 3.3 6.5 3.8 11.4 21.3 36.7
Total (3) 3.8 7.5 8.0 19.4 37.4 56.9
(3) as % of Recurrent 5% 8% 8% 17% 28% 34%
Revenue **
Source: Ministry of Finance.
*Revised budget.
**The Public debt servicing is here related to
Recurrent expenditure instead of exports because its 
impact on foreign exchange availability is 
totally absorbed by the Rand Monetary Agreement. 
However, it has a very pervasive impact on 
public sector liquidity.
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on social and physical instrastructure and public buildings 
and private homes. The real cost to Lesotho include 
costs of repairs, compensation, an increased defence 
budget (22% of the total recurrent budget or R24.9 
million in 1983/84), and a loss in revenue resulting 
from a slump in tourism.82 Associated with the policy 
of Distabi1izat ion is the growing population of refugees 
from South Africa, Lesotho has to divert resources 
in order to look after a large number of refugees estimated 
at 10,000 in January, 19838?
The last points to mention here is that the government 
machinery for the collection of revenue is itself 
"ineficient and as such there is a considerable loss 
of revenue which could go a long way in alleviating 
Government financial ills"84 The situation is complicated 
by the proliferation of out-of-market transactions 
particularly resulting from a fast expanding informal 
sector. In the Leribe District, basic tax revenue 
was reported to have fallen by 37% this year.85 
This decline cannot be explained by an increase in 
the migration of man rather than by clear evasion.
Revenue collection points are only found at district 
headquarters and this limits the scope of their operations, 
and thus augments the total amount of revenue foregone.
82. The Chronicle, Zimbabwe, 22 Jan. 1983.
83. The Sunday Times, 23 Jan. 1983
84. Mothepu, M.N. "The Management of Recurrent Costs:
.-Lesotho's Experience," June, 1983, CPDO.
85. Radio Lesotho, 19th July, 1983. Basic tax is
paid by every male citizen.
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5.0 Conclusion
In this report, an attempt has been made to isolate leakages from 
the most structurally dependent of the small states 
of Southern Africa. Leakages themselves are a result 
of the iorced integration of the Lesotho economy into 
that of: South Africa, a process which began close 
to one century ago, . and is characterised by calculated 
measures aimed at plundering Lesotho's productive 
capacity. Today, Lesotho is not only a labour-exporting 
dependency with 66.3% of all its male wage employees 
working in South Africa, but all its markets are totally 
i n  the orbit of South African domination. In particular, 
this domination-, which is achieved through undermining 
local productive capacity, was formalized in agreements 
i n  the realm of labour exportation, commodity, and 
money markets.
Leakages from the Lesotho economy should thus be seen 
as a "Systematized" outflow of resources resulting 
from three factors:
(i) The historical plunder of Lesotho's economy
which has not only proved difficult to reverse 
but has turned Lesotho into a market for^
South Africa's high-priced goods and a labour 
reserve for South African mines;
( i i )  The membership of Lesotho to the Southern
African Customs Union (SACU), a South African- 
dominated regional institution which is 
an instrument for promoting South Africa's 
industrialization, and which is partly respon­
sible for undermining Lesotho's productive 
capacity; and
(iii) The Rand Monetary Agreement which provides
for a free transfer of money from Lesotho
to the South African'financial markets, 
as well as to finance a growing volume of 
imports from South Africa.
These three factors have created extreme distortions 
i n  the Lesotho economy to the effect that customs 
revenues, 50% of which is estimated to result from 
migrants imports, account for 84% of the governments 
recurrent revenue. In addition, private consumption 
alone takes 142% of the GDP, making the country rely 
heavily on imports of South African consumer goods.
The percentage of imports covered by exports has 
dropped from a 1965 level of 26.75% to a recoid 1^77
low of 6.22%.
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It appears that the highest leakages, in the case 
of Lesotho, come through commodity trade, especially 
imports, 97% of which come from South Africa.
These have worked to weaken the foreign aid and migrant 
earnings multipliers in the economy. Imports from 
South Africa tremendously weaken the impact of both 
foreign aid and migrant earnings on the Lesotho economy. 
In addition, because of South Africa's use of both 
tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as monopolistic 
industrial structure, the prices of South African 
imports are above world prices. South Africa also 
contributes to inflation in Lesotho. 86 The benefits 
of both cases accrue to South Africa. Leakages through 
imports should not however, overshadow Lesotho's contri­
bution to South Africa's economic development through 
the labour and financial markets in the form of high 
profits made possible by underpaying labour as well 
as in the form of transfer of funds through the banking 
system.
All the formal agreements signed with South Africa 
provide for consultations and renegotiation, but latest 
developments show that Lesotho's options are limited.
Unlike its two companions, Botswana and Swaziland, 
Lesotho cannot embark on a radical course because 
of its 100% bordering on South Africa. Although there 
is a potential break-through in the fields of telecommu­
nications, air transport and water and electricity, 
their success in eliminating leakages from the economy 
still has . to be seen. The reduction of most of these 
leakages will only be fostered by the elimination 
of a hostile environment in Southern Africa and by 
the creation of regional authorities whose aim will 
be to rationalize the development of the sub-continent.
86. In 1980, the inflation rate averaged 16-17%, 
food reached 28% in November 1980, see AED, 
30th January, 1981.
APPENDIX I
FINANCIAL LEAKAGES AND THE PRODUCTIVITY OF FOREIGN
EXCHANGE IN LESOTHO
The two-gap model specifies that the growth of an 
underdeveloped economy is constrained by two elements: 
the availability of domestic savings and foreign 
exchange. Foreign aid (grants, loans, and foreign 
capital inflows) plays a dual role of relaxing 
both of these constraints. This means that the 
transformation of domestically-produced goods 
into imports either through export-promotion or 
import-substitut ion is limited. For most African 
countries, both industrialization (import substitution) 
and the export sector (esp. agriculture) have 
suffered serious set-backs. The % coverage of 
the import bill by export revenue has also been 
minimal.
There are four policy aspects of the two-gap model;
(i) If foreign - exchange is the bottleneck,
the marginal product of domestic savings 
is zero;
(ii) If savings is a bottleneck, the marginal
product of borrowing is lower than in
U ) ;
(iii) For a binding saving constraint, if
the marginal propensity to save is 
higher than the average propensity, 
to save, then a potentially-attainable 
growth rate financed through foreign 
aid will eventually become self-sustaining.
(iv) For a binding saving constraint, if
the marginal propensity to save is lower 
than the average propensity to save, 
a potentially - attainable growtli rate 
financed through foreign aid will never 
be self-sustaining.
I will specify the model in somewhat traditional 
but simplified fashion with minor modification,* 
using the following variables:
* See Mckinnon, R. "Foreign Exchange Constraints 
in Economic Development and Efficient Aid Allocation 
in Economic Journal, LXXIV, June 1964.
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Q(t) - Domestic Product
V(t)
'
Domestic Production
(Q(t) + imported raw materials)
M O - Domestic component of capital stock
Km (t) - Imported " " " "
S(t) - Savings
§(t) - Maximum possible savings
I (t) - Investiment (+depreciation)
F(t) - Net foreign capital inflow
Eft) - Exports
M(t) - Imports
E(t) - Maximum possible exports.
M(t) - Minimum imports required
L(t) - Labour
With these specifications, let us assume away
complications and use three factors of production: 
domestically-produced capital goods (K^); imported 
capital goods (Km ) ; and Labour. Using a Leontief 
production function,*
Q(t) = Min[Kd(t), Km (t) , L (t)]
ex. d o(m B
(all marginal products greater than zero)
Since Lesotho is a labour-surplus economy (loosely),
Kd and Km become simultaneously binding constraints, 
and
Kd (t) = <*dQ(t), Km(t) = m Q(t).
Our investment will be split into investment
from domestically-produced capital goods and investment
from imported capital goods. This gives us:
* With limited domestic resources and an undiversified 
external market for Lesotho, the combination 
of domestic and import 'd inputs will tend towards 
fixed proportions.
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1 (t) = Kd(t) + n y t ) *  (i)
( cK, d + &  m) Q (t)
0{ QCt)
where o( = o< d + c * m
Let us assume that S(t), the maximum possible 
savings, has a linear relationship to output and 
is either more or equal to actual savings. Therefore:
S(t) = sQ(t) 5 , SCt). (2)
Since Lesotho does not have sufficient savings, 
the balance on investment is covered with foreign 
capital inflows as follows:
I(t) = S(t) + F(t) (3)
A minimum level of imports is required for capital 
formation as well as consumption. This means 
that below this minimum, many things would go 
wrong.* Therefore actual imports are greater 
than or equal to this minimum:
M(t) ^ M(t) (4)
n  Km (t) + « c QCt) 
n « „  QCt) + c< c QCt)
where ®(c > 0 .
Lesotho has difficulty in penetrating international 
markets, (esp. SACU) and suffers a severe scarcity 
of productive resources. The export sector is 
therefore heavily impaired. There is a limit 
in the amount Lesotho can export. Maximum-possible 
exports are a fraction of t h e  d o m e s t i c  product, 
and actual exports are e i t h e r  s m a l l e r  than or 
equal to maximum-possible e x p o r t s :
T1 = terms of trade or the relative price; 
•(dot) = d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  over t i m e .
* This was e x p e r i e n c e d  in Lesotho when South 
Africa closed its side ot the b o r d e r  - see 
The Friend, 3 0 t h  May, 19H3.
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E(t) = tQ(t) * E(t) (5)
Foreign exchange available to a country is equal 
to the sum of export earnings, foreign capital 
inflows, and loan and grant finances, and this 
is also equivalent to the value of imports of 
both capital and consumption goods.
T h e r e f o r e :
M (t) = E (t) + F(t) (6)
Since Lesotho has no full control over foreign 
capital, loan, and grant inflows, F(t) will be 
exogenous in this model.
Let us assume that Lesotho has the highest' Potentially-attainable 
rate of growth, r. This is the rate of growth 
which could be attained if this economy could 
eliminate most of the leakages. Then:
Q(t) = rQ(t) (7)
To enable a solution to this system of seven equations 
in six unknowns, Chenery et al* split F(t) into 
Fs (t) which is the net capital inflow needed 
toachieve saving-investment equilibrium in equation
(3) - the saving gap, and Fr(t) which is the net 
capital inflow needed to achieve import-export 
equilibrium in equation (6) - the trade gap.
The assumption we made earlier was that it is 
difficult to transform domestic resources into 
foreign exchange. This means that even if Lesotho 
can realize enough savings to.achieve the highest potentially 
- attainable growth rate, the latter cannot be 
achieved because of the difficulties of transforming 
domestic resources into foreign exchange either 
by export-promotion or by import-substitut ion.
If F(t) was endogenous, the saving limited growth 
rate is
s + f where f - F (t)
Q(t)
(8)
* Chenery, H.B. and P. Dorf . in "Optimal Growth Patterns in 
an Open Economy", paper pres od to the Econometric 
Society, San Fransisco, Decombei, 1966.
rs = Q O )
Q(t)
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On the other hand, if a country has no control over 
foreign capital inflows, F (t) , and conditions 
M (t ) = M (t) and E(t) = E (t) hold, our trade- 
limited growth rate is
rt = Q ( t ) = £ + f c
Q ( t )
By definition of the trade gap.
t + f - ^  m ^ s + f
or cC ( I + f - c < s
n  ^  m
it means that with a trade-1 imited growth rate,
a portion of savings is lost because there is
no foreign exchange component to sustain a potentially 
higher growth rate rs . There is a waste of 
potential savings in the system.
The impact of foreign aid transfers in this model 
can easily be demonstrated to depend on which 
- gap is binding. From equation (8) and (9),
3  rs = 1_, and
S f
3 rt = 1, respectively.
(f) f T1(X m
But 0{ = 0( d + m ( H  only relative price).
Therefore
<3 f
- 6 -
Tli i s finding tells us that foreign aid transfers will 
always have a proportionately greater impact on 
the growth rate if the trade constriaint holds 
or if there is a foreign exhange bottleneck than 
if a savings bottleneck holds. On the other hand, 
if the shortage of savings is the limit to growth, 
foreign aid transfers have to provide for both 
the domestic and imported component of the capital 
stock required to achieve the highest potentially-attainable 
growth rate. But if foreign exhange is the 
limit to growth, foreign aid transfers provide 
only the imported component of the capital stock 
required for growth, while the domestic component 
is being provided by using the under - utilized 
potential domestic savings.
Many African countries* have for the past two 
years or so frozen or even cut-down their development 
programmes because of the constraints introduced 
by the conditions for getting foreign assistance 
- the demand by donors that there should be counterpart 
contribution or a complementary supply of the 
domestic component. This immediately translates 
itself into savings limited growth. However, 
many studies show that S(t) < S(t).** On the 
other hand, the equations above show that for 
a savings constraint, there are many policy variables 
which could be utilized. One wonders therefore 
why Lesotho has not succeeded in utilizing these 
variables and still suffers from the position 
of chronic dependency on foreign aid, even for 
a significant portion of the domestic component.
This model is used here as a tool for demonstrating 
that there are leakages in the Lesotho economy 
which act to suppress potential - attainable growth 
rates even after increased injections of foreign 
assistance. All or some of the variables, 
n  Km (t), SCt), M(t) or c<c QCt) and E(t) are 
affected by these leakages and thus further increase 
the dependency of Lesotho on foreign aid transfers,
*This is still the case in Lesotho, see: Hon. K.T.J. Rakhetl-.v, 
M.P. "Budget Speech Presenting the !,;83 8 t • ■'os o- 
Revenue and Expenditure. Maseru, 5 .
** Mottura, P. "Savings Mobil 
Countries" in Mauri.
A Tool for Development,
VO LOtO.1 u
-yj. >•
• ■ • :a ■
•>a 'v
. . .
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Even if the two-gap model has its own limitations, 
its value in demonstrating the importance of studying 
the subject of leakages has been demonstrated.
It is clearly shown that as long as there exists 
serious leakages from the Lesotho economy, foreign 
aid translates itself into increased indebtedness 
without a significant impact. .This was experienced 
in late seventies when substantial foreign aid 
inflows were largely associated with increased 
imports of South African imports.
Appendix II
DUTIES COLLECTED IN LESOTHO FOR 
THE COMMON CUSTOMS UNION POOL - 
1978/79-1980/81 (ROOO'S)
Customs Excise Ad Valorem Surch arge Tot,
Year Duties Dut ies Exc. Duties
1978/79 12.9 289 . 8 52.3 13 .3 368
1979/80 11.5 567 .2 8 . 8 8 . 8 596
1980/81 25.1 4 ,006.9 12.3 1 .7 4,046
Source: Dept. of Customs and Excise.
THE ORGIN OF LESOTHO’S IMPORTS FOR PURPOSES OF CALCULATING
T FtT "lT rR irC T ''T )"U T V "C O N T  E N T  C O N T E N T ---------------------------
Commodity or.Group S.I.T.C.
\
B.T.N. Total 
c.i.f. Lesotho
Oi*igin % Origin by dutiable 
Value
R.S.A. Other R.S.A. Other
Live Animals 00 2,427 100 2,427
Foodstuffs 01-09 35,518 96.6 3.4 34,301 1,215
Beverages and Tobacco 11 7,863 95.4 4.6 7,500 363
Crude Materials 21-27 1,295 96.0 4.0 1,243 52
Mineral Fuels & lubricants 32-35 11,742 75.6 24.4 8.881 2,862
Animal & Vegetable fat and oils 41-42 1,561 93.5 6.5 1,459 102
Chemical Elements and Compounds 51-59 9,525 75.3 24.7 7,172 2,353
actured goods classified by
Material
61-69 41,807 82.7 17.3 34,568 7,239
c. ■ r.ery and Transport Equipment 71-73 22,730 62.0 38.0 14,083 8,647
Miscellaneous Manufactured 81-94 45,140 87.2 12.8 39,349 5,791
179,608 84.1% 15.9% 150,983 28,624
Source: Gray, J.G. and Hoohlo, S.G. The Direct Duty content
of Lesotho's Imports and the Protective Price Raising 
Effect of Tariff Protection by South Africa, Ford Research 
Project, Nov. 1978.
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